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ABSTRACT
Human rights violations are perpetrated by corporate actors
with troubling frequency. In most instances, victims do not have
access to remedy. For thirty years, the United States has been a
beacon of hope, its courts adjudicating human rights claims against
corporate defendants under the Alien Tort Statute. Then, in Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court closed the door on
human rights plaintiffs. This Article charts the rise of the United
Kingdom as a venue to bring suit. The U.K. Supreme Court, in a farreaching judgment from 2019, upheld a decision to allow plaintiffs
to sue a London-headquartered parent company for grave
environmental damage and harm to local communities’ livelihoods
that occurred through the operations of the company’s Zambian
subsidiary. The dichotomy in approaches between the U.S. and the
U.K. courts has prompted consideration of the following: is there
anything that can be drawn from the U.K. litigation to improve
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access to remedy in the U.S. courts for victims of human rights
violations by corporate actors? This Article concludes that the
argument used in the U.K. case law to attribute liability directly to
parent companies should be taken up in the United States.
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INTRODUCTION

Impunity for human rights violations by corporate actors is a
profound and pervasive injustice in the globalized world.
Transnational business frequently operates in places where victims
cannot get access to remedy in local courts. There is no international
forum that provides an alternative path to justice. For thirty years,
until recently, the United States offered a beacon of hope through
adjudication of human rights cases against corporate defendants
under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”). Then, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court closed the door on human rights
plaintiffs by drastically curtailing the ATS.1 Later rulings of the
Supreme Court dealt further blows to plaintiffs by limiting the
courts’ personal jurisdiction over corporate defendants2 and
prohibiting ATS claims against foreign companies.3 The very
question of corporate liability under the statute now hangs in the
balance.4
As one door closes, another has opened. The United Kingdom
Supreme Court, in a far-reaching and underreported judgment from
2019,5 confirmed a trend of English courts expanding the conditions
under which a parent company can be held directly liable under the
common law—not international law—for the tortious acts of its

569 U.S. 108 (2013).
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
3
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
4
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 188 (2020). The case has been granted
certiorari before the Supreme Court on the question of corporate liability. Oral
argument took place on Dec. 1, 2020. Commentary about the oral argument is
cautiously optimistic for the plaintiffs. See Beth Van Schaack, Nestlé & Cargill v.
Doe Series: In Oral Arguments, Justices Weigh Liability for Chocolate Companies, JUST
SEC. (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73727/nestle-cargill-v-doeseries-in-oral-arguments-justices-weigh-liability-for-chocolate-companies/
[https://perma.cc/XHF8-C3MK]. For a discussion of corporate liability under the
ATS, see Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations:
Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304 (2008) and William S. Dodge,
Corporate Liability Under Customary International Law, 43 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 1045 (2012).
5
See Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20 (Eng.) (affirming
Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 and Lungowe v.
Vedanta Resources PLC [2016] EWHC 975 (TCC)). See also Tara Van Ho, Vedanta
Resources PLC and Another v. Lungowe and Others, 114 AM. J. INT’L. L 110 (2020); Dalia
Palombo, The Duty of Care of the Parent Company: A Comparison between French Law,
UK Precedents and the Swiss Proposals, 4 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 265 (2019).
1
2
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overseas subsidiaries.6 The result of this case, Lungowe v. Vedanta
Resources, is that plaintiffs in transnational business and human
rights litigation have a stronger foundation on which to build their
tort claims for damages against parent companies. The decision was
unanimously reaffirmed by the U.K. Supreme Court in a second
case, Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC.7 The legal argument for direct
parent company liability used in Lungowe and Okpabi has been
applied in other European countries8 and common law
jurisdictions,9 demonstrating that the U.K. precedent is having an
echo effect on international jurisprudence. That effect has not yet
been felt in the United States, however.
The current dichotomy between the United States and the
United Kingdom10 has prompted consideration of the following: are
the prospects for transnational business and human rights litigation
in the United States as diminished as commentators portray them to
be? Is there anything that can be drawn from the U.K. experience to
improve access to remedy in the U.S. courts for victims of human
rights violations at the hands of corporate actors? In answering
these questions, this Article argues that expanding the
circumstances in which a common law duty of care is imposed on a
parent company for harm that occurs through its overseas
operations is vital to enable victims to vindicate their rights against
one of the actors that caused them harm.
Direct parent company liability is the key to achieving this
vindication. By acknowledging the multiple ways in which the
6
The U.K. is divided into four separate legal jurisdictions, one of which is
England and Wales. For the purposes of this Article, only this jurisdiction will be
considered and references to England and the English courts shall be deemed to
include Wales and Welsh courts.
7
Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2021] UKSC 3 (overturning Okpabi v.
Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191 and Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell
PLC [2017] EWHC 89 (TCC)).
8
See, e.g., Rb. Den Haag 30 januari 2013, JOR 2013, 162 m.nt. JF (Akpan/Royal
Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.); Hof’s-Den Haag 18 december 2015, NJF 2015, 3857 m.nt.
F.C.S. Warendorf (Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.); Hof’s-Den Haag 29
januari 2021, NJ 2021, 77 m.nt. (Milieudefensie/Shell Petroleum NV) (Neth.).
9
See, e.g., Choc v. Hudbay Minerals, Inc., [2013] ONSC 1414 (Can. Ont. Sup.
Ct. J.).
10
The difference between the two pivotal decisions from the United States
and the United Kingdom, Kiobel and Lungowe, respectively, has been described as
“night and day.” See Doug Cassel, Vedanta v. Lungowe Symposium: Beyond
Vedanta–Reconciling Tort Law with International Human Rights Norms, OPINIO JURIS
(Apr.
19,
2019),
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/19/vedanta-v-lungowesymposium-beyond-vedanta-reconciling-tort-law-with-international-human-right
s-norms%EF%BB%BF/ [https://perma.cc/43A5-EXFB].
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relationship between parent and subsidiary companies is conducted
in a modern global enterprise, and attributing liability for
intervention on the parent’s part that has been instrumental in the
harm the plaintiffs have suffered, the direct liability approach not
only opens up the possibility of substantive parent company
liability, but also connects the allegations in the case to the U.S.
territory by focusing on the culpable actions or omissions of the U.S.
parent company that occur at the headquarter level. This provides
a counterpoint to the forum non conveniens defense and to concerns
about infringement on host state sovereignty which infuse the recent
ATS case law. Moreover, the relative success of the direct liability
argument and the receptiveness of the courts in the United Kingdom
and other jurisdictions to these claims11 may be a powerful
argument to counter the unease about jurisdictional overreach that
underlies recent Supreme Court decisions.12
The Article is organized in five parts. Part II traces the global
trend in growth of transnational business and human rights
litigation, noting the hurdles to bringing such cases, and
highlighting the particular challenge presented by the corporate
veil. Part III explores the current status of transnational business
and human rights litigation in both federal and state courts. It
briefly outlines the history of ATS claims, identifying the legal
hurdles to their success. It considers the parallel conventional tort
litigation trend both pre and post Kiobel, asking whether, in the
period since Kiobel, the predicted wave of state tort litigation has
materialized,13 and identifying legal hurdles to success in such cases.
Turning the focus to the role of the corporate veil, Part III also
discusses how liability is attributed to the parent company in
transnational business and human rights litigation in the United
States and, in particular, the test of agency. In Part IV, the case
analysis turns to England. This has been the primary venue for
transnational business and human rights litigation outside the

11 See, e.g., Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya (2020), 443 D.L.R. 4th 183 (Can.)
(holding that a claim for customary international law violations could proceed to
trial before the Canadian courts).
12
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Daimler AG
v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
13
See generally Roger P. Alford, Human Rights After Kiobel: Choice of Law and
the Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 1089 (2014) (arguing that the
most likely avenue for plaintiffs post Kiobel will be pleading violations of state or
foreign tort laws).
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United States,14 although Canada may possibly surpass it after the
recent Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya ruling by the Supreme Court of
Canada.15 The focus here is on the development of direct liability
for the tort of negligence as a means of attributing liability to the
parent company, and the application of the test. Part V draws
together examples from other common law and civil law
jurisdictions where the direct liability argument has been used in
tort litigation, to demonstrate the uptake and development of the
legal principle internationally. Part VI compares the agency
approach adopted by courts in the United States with the direct
liability approach taken in the United Kingdom and considers what
lessons for the United States can be drawn from the English
litigation. It concludes that the argument used in the U.K. case law
to attribute liability directly to parent companies should be taken up
in the United States.
14
See Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S.
Courts: A Comparative Scorecard, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 127, 127-28 (2013); Astrid
Sanders, The Impact of the ‘Ruggie Framework’ and the ‘United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights’ on Transnational Human Rights Litigation, in
THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE: MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK
288, 290 (Jena Martin & Karen Bravo eds., 2015); see also TREVOR C. HARTLEY,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 310 (2009) (discussing the advantages of bringing legal
proceedings in the English courts); Jonathan Watts, BHP Billiton Facing £5bn Lawsuit
from Brazilian Victims of Dam Disaster, GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/nov/06/bhp-billiton-facing5bn-lawsuit-from-brazilian-victims-of-dam-disaster
[https://perma.cc/XYZ8E42P] (detailing cases against BHP Billiton for a dam disaster in Brazil); Município
de Mariana v. BHP Group PLC [2020] EWHC 2930 (TCC); John Vidal, ‘Mollah’s Life
was Typical’: The Deadly Ship Graveyards of Bangladesh, GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jan/31/khalid-molla
h-life-was-typical-the-deadly-ship-graveyards-of-bangladesh?CMP=Share_iOSAp
p_Other [https://perma.cc/T6QE-GUVR] (describing litigation against shipping
company Maran for the death of a ship breaker in Bangladesh); Hamida Begum v.
Maran (UK) Ltd [2020] EWHC 1846 (QB); Hamida Begum v. Maran (UK) Ltd [2021]
EWHC Civ 326; Tanzanian Victims Commence Legal Action in UK against Barrick (Feb.
10, 2020), https://www.raid-uk.org/blog/tanzanian-victims-commence-legalaction-uk-against-barrick [https://perma.cc/2RBF-ZUUX] (regarding litigation
against Barrick Tz alleging serious abuses by security forces in Tanzania); Kate
Hodal, Petra Diamonds Pays £4.3m to Tanzanians ‘Abused’ by its Contractors,
GUARDIAN
(May
18,
2021),
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/may/18/petra-diamo
nds-pays-43m-to-tanzanians-abused-by-its-contractors [https://perma.cc/5D5JX58A]; Sarah Boseley, Tobacco Firms in Move to Strike out Malawi Exploitation Case,
GUARDIAN
(May
19,
2021),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/may/19/tobacco-firms-in-moveto-strike-out-malawi-exploitation-case [https://perma.cc/4HVG-JX44].
15
Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya (2020), 443 D.L.R. 4th 183 (Can.).
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BARRIERS TO TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS LITIGATION: THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATE VEIL

This Part introduces transnational business and human rights
litigation and the role of the corporate veil as an impediment to
plaintiffs bringing such cases.
a. Business and Human Rights Litigation: The Global Picture
A number of jurisdictions have developed a body of
jurisprudence, which, to varying degrees, allows their courts to
accept jurisdiction over claims where extraterritorial human rights
violations committed by or in conjunction with corporate actors are
framed as tort lawsuits and brought against a parent company in its
home state.16 The development of this body of jurisprudence dates
back to the 1980s when one of the original transnational tort claims
was brought in U.S. courts following the catastrophic chemical leak
at Bhopal in India.17 The American parent company, Union Carbide,
was alleged to be liable in tort on the grounds that it exercised
extensive control over its Indian subsidiary, the operator of the
pesticides plant in Bhopal from where the chemicals leaked, killing
and injuring tens of thousands of people.18 That control was
evidenced, for instance, by the parent company’s involvement in
key decisions regarding plant design and safety.19 The U.S. courts’
dismissal of the case on grounds that India was the appropriate

16
The term “home state” in relation to a multinational group of companies is
used to denote the state in which the parent company is a corporate national. From
a commercial, but not necessarily legal, perspective, this is the place where the
group is headquartered or where the relevant decisions about actions in the host
state are taken. The term “host state” refers to any state other than the home state
in which that group operates or invests, or which is a significant source of goods or
services for the group or its constituent companies.
17
In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984,
634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
U.S. 199 (1987).
18 Id. at 844.
19
AMNESTY INT’L, INJUSTICE INCORPORATED: CORPORATE ABUSES AND THE
HUMAN RIGHT TO REMEDY 33-37 (2014).
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forum for the litigation,20 and the subsequent low value settlement
of all proceedings against the corporate group by the Government
of India,21 highlighted how difficult it is for victims in transnational
business and human rights litigation to get access to remedy. The
gravity of the injustice for the victims of Bhopal fomented the
emerging international movement that demanded corporate
accountability for extraterritorial harms.22
In the years that followed the initiation of the Bhopal litigation,
a number of tort claims were brought before U.S.—mainly federal—
courts23 against American parent companies regarding the overseas
operations of their subsidiaries.24 From the 1990s onwards, the
federal ATS became the most common cause of action for plaintiffs
bringing suit against corporations for alleged human rights
violations overseas. Conventional tort claims were sometimes
brought in parallel with ATS claims.25 During this period, tort cases
were also initiated against corporate defendants in England and
Wales,26 Canada,27 and Australia.28 With no statutory equivalent to
the ATS, these cases in other common law countries were framed as
conventional tort claims, and were dwarfed in number by the ATS
claims.29 In recent years, since the U.S. Supreme Court cut back the
In re Union Carbide, 634 F. Supp at 866.
AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 19, at 48-53.
22
The litigation about Bhopal against Union Carbide and its successor
company Dow continues to this day. See id. at 33-63; Anita Ramasastry, Corporate
Social Responsibility Versus Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Gap Between
Responsibility and Accountability, 14 J. HUM. RTS. 237, 240 (2015); Surya Deva, Bhopal:
The Sage Continues 31 Years On, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM PRINCIPLES
TO PRACTICE 24 (Dorothée Baumann-Pauly & Justine Nolan eds., 2014).
23
Filing in federal district courts is under the diversity jurisdiction set out in
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
24 See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d,
303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (filed in 1993).
25 The difference between the two is that the ATS claims allege violations of
customary international law norms, while the conventional tort claims allege
federal or state torts as grounds for liability. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395
F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and remanded, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
26
Connelly v. RTZ Corp. [1998] A.C. 854 (HL); Sithole v. Thor Chem.
Holdings, Ltd. [1999] EWCA (Civ) 706; Lubbe v. Cape PLC [2000] UKHL 41 (HL).
27
Recherches Internationales Québec v. Cambior Inc., 1998 CarswellQue 1430
(Can. Que. Sup. Ct.).
28
Dagi v Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. (1997) 1 VR 428 (Austl.).
29
Andrew Sanger, Corporations and Transnational Litigation: Comparing Kiobel
with the Jurisprudence of English Courts, 107 AM. J. INT’L. L UNBOUND 23 (2014); Peter
Muchlinski & Virginie Rouas, Foreign Direct-Liability Litigation: Towards the
20
21
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scope of the ATS in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.30 and Jesner v.
Arab Bank,31 there has been renewed interest among the academy in
common law tort claims as a vehicle for this litigation.32 Some
scholars have looked to non-U.S. experience of such claims as
offering a way forward for business and human rights litigation.33
There are a number of challenges that plaintiffs in these
conventional tort claims must overcome, however.
b. The Corporate Veil
Three separate but interlocked veils operate to shield parent
companies from liability in transnational business and human rights
claims, namely: the corporate veil, the contractual veil, and the
jurisdictional veil.34 With the corporate veil, the issue is how to
attribute liability to the parent company when it has some direct
knowledge and level of involvement in the misconduct, but the
proximate cause of the harm is the subsidiary company’s actions.35
Transnationalization of Corporate Legal Responsibility, in CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS: NEW EXPECTATIONS AND PARADIGMS 357 (Lara Blecher
et al. eds., 2014); Richard Meeran, Tort Litigation Against Multinational Corporations
for Violation of Human Rights: An Overview of the Position Outside the United States, 3
CITY U. H.K.L. REV. 1 (2011); SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION (2004).
30
569 U.S. 108 (2013).
31
138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018) (discussed further in Part III); see also Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
32
Roger P. Alford, for example, argues, “[t]he most important alternative
avenue [to the ATS] is tort law. Indeed, one could say that the future of human
rights litigation in the United States depends on refashioning human rights claims
as state or foreign tort violations.” Roger P. Alford, The Future of Human Rights
Litigation After Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749, 1749-50 (2014). For other
examples, see infra note 113.
33
Goldhaber, supra note 14, at 128; see also Jodie A. Kirshner, A Call for the EU
to Assume Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Corporate Human Rights Abuses, 13 NW. J.
INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 17 (2015); Doug Cassel, Outlining the Case for a Common Law Duty
of Care of Business to Exercise Human Rights Due Diligence, 1 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 179
(2016).
34
See Peter Muchlinski, Limited Liability and Multinational Enterprises: A Case
for Reform?, 34 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 915, 920 (2010) (introducing the concept of the
jurisdictional veil).
35
Attributing liability to parent companies in transnational tort litigation is
the subject of numerous scholarly works. Foundational contributions from Phillip
I. Blumberg on corporate groups and the drawbacks of limited liability form the
backdrop to the discussion in this Article. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability
and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573 (1986).
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The long-established corporate law principles of the corporate veil,
separate personality, and limited liability operate to prevent the
parent corporation from being liable for the subsidiary’s
wrongdoing. With the contractual veil, in circumstances where the
relationship is not one of equity but rather one of contract between
the parent (also called “lead”) company and its suppliers, the
separate personalities of the corporations and the terms of their
contractual relationship prevent the parent company from being
liable for the supplier’s wrongdoing. With the jurisdictional veil, the
territorial sovereignty principle from public international law gives
the host state authority to prescribe rules governing people and
events on its territory, and to adjudicate related disputes. A
corollary of territorial sovereignty is the jurisdictional veil, which
limits the home state’s power to exercise its legal authority
extraterritorially in order to prescribe rules and adjudicate disputes
when harm occurs in the host state. While all three veils act to shield
parent companies from liability when harm occurs ostensibly at the
hands of a subsidiary or supplier, it is the corporate veil that is the
focus here. Positive case law developments outside the United
States—which have triggered the authorship of this Article—have
helped to lessen the strictures of the corporate veil.36 The role of the
jurisdictional veil as an impediment to plaintiffs’ success in
transnational business and human rights litigation against parent
companies will be touched on, as well, given its significance as a
hurdle to plaintiffs in U.S. litigation exemplified in cases dismissed
on grounds of forum non conveniens or the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
The basic premise of the corporate veil was set out by the U.S.
Supreme Court in United States v. Bestfoods, “[i]t is a general principle
of corporate law deeply ‘ingrained in our economic and legal
systems’ that a parent corporation . . . is not liable for the acts of its
subsidiaries.”37 “The doctrine of limited liability holds that, in
principle, the shareholders in a business may not be held liable for

36
It has been argued that direct liability can also be applicable when
companies are divided by the contractual veil. See Landgericht Dortmund
[Dortmund District Court] Jan. 10, 2019, 7 O 95/15, Justiz-online (Ger.)
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/lgs/dortmund/lg_dortmund/j2019/7_O_95_1
5_Urteil_20190110.html [https://perma.cc/FQP5-JJKE]; see also infra Part V. The
focus here is primarily on companies linked by equity.
37
524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998) (quoting William O. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks,
Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 Yale L.J. 193, 193 (1929)).
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the debts of that business beyond the level of their investment.”38
The related doctrine of separate personality holds that the legal
personality of one business is distinct from the legal personality of
another business, separating them by a corporate veil, regardless of
the links of ownership and/or control between them.
Historically, limited liability existed to encourage economic
growth by protecting entrepreneurs so that they could invest in
businesses without fear of personal liability. But, as Phillip
Blumberg famously noted, the concept of limited liability originates
from a time when corporations were not generally allowed to hold
shares in other corporations, meaning that the parent–subsidiary
relationship did not exist.39 The use of the corporate veil to shield
parent companies from liability for the debts of their subsidiaries in
corporate groups “opens the door to multiple layers of insulation
[from liability], a consequence unforeseen when limited liability was
[first] adopted.”40 It also belies the links of strategy, control and
other forms of intervention that connect the different companies in
a corporate group and that are recognized economically and
politically,41 provoking some scholars to advocate for wholesale
reform of limited liability in human rights cases against
corporations.42
38
GWYNNE SKINNER, ROBERT MCCORQUODALE & OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, THE
THIRD PILLAR: ACCESS TO JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS 57 (2013) (citing Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 361-62
(1944)).
39
Phillip I. Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational Corporations: The Barriers
Presented by Concepts of the Corporate Juridical Entity, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 297, 300–04 (2001).
40
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW:
THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 139 (1993).
41
Blumberg, supra note 39, at 303. Ironically, empirical studies have shown
that courts are less likely to pierce the corporate veil to expose the corporate
shareholders in corporate groups, as opposed to individual shareholders. See
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 1036, 1038 (1991).
42
See Gwynne Skinner, Rethinking Limited Liability of Parent Corporations for
Foreign Subsidiaries’ Violations of International Human Rights Law, 72 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1769 (2015); Anil Yilmaz Vastardis & Rachel Chambers, Overcoming the
Corporate Veil Challenge: Could Investment Law Inspire the Proposed Business and
Human Rights Treaty?, 67 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 389 (2018). To address this problem,
Skinner proposed a new statute-based model that would allow courts to disregard
limited liability of parent corporations for claims of customary international human
rights violations and serious environmental torts, where a parent corporation takes
a majority interest or creates a subsidiary as part of a unified economic enterprise
that operates in a “high-risk host country.” See GWYNNE SKINNER, PARENT COMPANY
ACCOUNTABILITY: ENSURING JUSTICE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 24 (2015).
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There are various techniques that plaintiffs in tort litigation may
adopt to attribute liability to the parent company when it has some
direct knowledge and some level of involvement in the subsidiary’s
alleged wrongdoing.43 The first option is to seek to pierce the
corporate veil and make the parent company liable for the
negligence of its subsidiary. Tests vary for veil piercing, but in most
jurisdictions this power is reserved for exceptional cases only.44 In
the United States, there are different tests applied in different states.
But, generally speaking, the corporate veil can only be pierced when
the parent “misuses the separate corporate form for wrongful
purposes and controls the subsidiary to the extent that the
subsidiary is a mere instrument of the parent.”45 Scholars have
documented that veil-piercing tests are vague and inconsistently
applied by the courts.46 Plaintiffs therefore use other methods to
attribute liability to the parent company: in particular they allege
that the subsidiary acted as an agent for the parent company in the
particular action that gave rise to the claim.47
As discussed below,48 establishing agency is a significant hurdle
for plaintiffs to surmount, although not as difficult as veil piercing.
Another technique that has been used in tort cases in common law
countries outside the United States is to allege that the parent
company is directly liable for harm in respect of its own primary
breach of duty, based on the parent owing its own duty of care to
the plaintiffs. This theory, sometimes referred to as “foreign direct
liability,”49 holds that “when a parent company is directly involved
[to a sufficient degree] in its subsidiary’s operations or exercises de
43
This Article does not address the problem identified by Skinner of “victims
left without a remedy where the parent has a more separate relationship from the
subsidiary but still greatly benefits financially from the fact that it created a
subsidiary in a high-risk environment.” Skinner, supra note 42, at 1841.
44
Thompson, supra note 41, at 1044-45. Frequently the veil will only be
pierced “where there has been fraud or where the level of control by the parent
company is so extreme as to render the corporation an alter ego or a sham.”
Vastardis & Chambers, supra note 42, at 394-95. In English case law, an example of
this strict approach is Adams v. Cape Industries PLC [1989] AC 433 (appeal taken
from EWHC (Ch)) (Eng.).
45
Skinner, supra note 42, at 1797.
46
Id. at 1798.
47
Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
48
See generally infra Part III (discussing agency).
49
See generally Liesbeth Enneking, The Future of Foreign Direct Liability?
Exploring the International Relevance of the Dutch Shell Nigeria Case, UTRECHT L. REV.,
Jan. 2014, at 44 (charting the international trend of foreign direct liability cases and
the Dutch Shell Nigeria case’s status as part of that trend).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

532

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:3

facto control, then it owes a duty of care to its employees or anyone
affected by its [subsidiary’s] operations . . . [and] may be held liable
for harm flowing from its failure to competently perform the
functions” of its involvement.50 The development of direct liability
in case law is addressed in Parts III and IV below.
c. Arguments in Favor of Parent Company Liability
Attributing liability to the parent company allows plaintiffs to
bring within the frame of judicial consideration the parent’s acts of
supervision, management, and control of the subsidiary, which may
have been instrumental in the harm the plaintiffs have suffered,
ostensibly at the hands of the subsidiary. Furthermore, plaintiffs can
sue the parent company in the home state, its incorporation there
providing the required connection to the jurisdiction to enable the
home state courts to hear the claim, in accordance with the relevant
rules of domestic private international law.51 The necessity for
plaintiffs to have access to remedy in the courts of the home state of
the parent company as a result of the widely acknowledged
governance gap in corporate accountability is well covered in the
literature.52 In some instances, this is the only option for them when
host state remedies are absent or ineffective due to corruption,
weakness or absence of the rule of law, lack of financial resources to
enforce local laws, hold timely trials, etc.53 Accessing remedy in
home state courts also avoids plaintiffs having to seek compensation
from a local subsidiary, which may be impecunious or defunct.

Goldhaber, supra note 14, at 132.
The relevant cases on personal jurisdiction over corporate defendants are
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) and Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). For European Union states, jurisdiction is
governed by the Brussels Regulation recast, Council Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters. 2012 O.J. (L 351/1) art. 4 [hereinafter Brussels Regulation].
52
See, e.g., PENELOPE SIMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP:
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE (2014).
53
The flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) from around the mid twentieth
century onwards has been from industrialized countries of the Global North to
developing countries of the Global South. Although this pattern is changing, with
the result that “host state” is no longer synonymous with “developing country,”
this Article takes as its focus host countries of the Global South which may exhibit
the access to remedy problems listed here.
50
51
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The normative justification for holding a parent company
accountable for its negligent involvement in the harmful operations
of its subsidiary is compelling.54 The ability of parent companies to
exert influence and control across the whole corporate group while
retaining legal separation from the entities that comprise the rest of
the group makes transnational business uniquely able to take
advantage of the economic and regulatory reality of the globalized
world in which it operates.55 For example, it allows parent
companies to structure their liability risk by sometimes
undercapitalizing their foreign subsidiaries that might be the target
for claims due to the nature of the activities they undertake, or due
to the lower social or environmental standards adopted by business
in many developing host states,56 while at the same time often
“reap[ing] large economic benefits from these [] subsidiaries.”57
John Ruggie, the architect of the current international policy
consensus in this area—the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights (“UNGPs”)58—explicitly recognized the role of tort
law in providing access to remedy to victims of human rights abuse
at the hands of corporations,59 and urged states to address the
difficulties created by the corporate veil. Without making this a
legal obligation, the UNGPs tell states that in extraterritorial cases
See SKINNER, supra note 42.
PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 5-8 (2d ed.
2007); JANET DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 43-53
(2005).
56
The double standards practice of transnational business in relation to
environmental standards has been documented in at least two U.N. studies,
surveying businesses adopting lower environmental standards in the surveyed
developing countries than those adopted in developed countries. See Tetsuya
Morimoto, Research Paper, Growing Industrialization and our Damaged Planet: The
Extraterritorial Application of Developed Countries’ Domestic Environmental Laws to
Transnational Corporations Abroad, UTRECHT L. REV., DEC. 2005, AT 134, 137.
57
Vivian Grosswald Curran, Harmonizing Multinational Parent Company
Liability for Foreign Subsidiary Human Rights Violations, 17 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 403, 411
(2016).
58
Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other
Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/31, annex (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter UNGPs].
59
Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other
Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 9, 2007).
54
55
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they should consider ways to reduce the barriers that could lead to
a denial of access to remedy.60 Such barriers include “[t]he way in
which legal responsibility is attributed among members of a
corporate group” in a way that facilitates the “avoidance of
appropriate accountability.”61 Despite this recognition, and the
unanimous endorsement of the UNGPs by the U.N. Human Rights
Council,62 it remains the position that access to remedy is the most
neglected of the three UNGP pillars,63 and the global pattern is that
victims of business-related human rights abuse in extraterritorial
cases do not generally have access to effective remedies.64 One of
the key reasons for this is the difficulty tort plaintiffs have in
attributing liability to parent companies because of the corporate
veil.65
III.

TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES

This Part begins with a summary of the legal history and current
status of ATS and conventional tort litigation in the United States,
which grounds the analysis of whether prospects for such cases are
as diminished as commentators portray them to be.66 It explores the
reasons why courts have dismissed the majority of such claims and
the role of the corporate veil as a hurdle to plaintiffs. This Part
examines how plaintiffs seek to attribute liability to the parent
company in transnational business and human rights litigation,
UNGPs, supra note 58, at 23.
Id. Another barrier is “[w]here claimants face a denial of justice in a host
State and cannot access home State courts regardless of the merits of the claim.” Id.
62
State membership of the Human Rights Council at the time included the
United Kingdom and the United States. Membership of the Human Rights Council 19
June 2010 - 18 June 2011 by Year When Term Expires, UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Year20102011.aspx
[https://perma.cc/BZ72-VJ6G].
63
The other pillars are the state duty to protect and the corporate
responsibility to respect. UNGPs, supra note 58, at 4.
64
Cassel, supra note 33, at 182.
65
Skinner, supra note 42, at 1804 n.120; SKINNER, MCCORQUODALE & DE
SCHUTTER, supra note 38, at 56-59.
66
A comprehensive review of the history of ATS litigation is beyond the scope
of this Article. For an overall history and analysis of ATS cases, see Beth Stephens,
The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467 (2014) and
Beth Stephens, The Rise and Fall of the Alien Tort Statute, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS 46 (Surya Deva & David Birchall eds., 2020).
60
61
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using an emblematic example, Acuña-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining
Corporation.67 There follows, in Part VI, a comparison of the relevant
law in the United States and the United Kingdom, and
recommendations for U.S. courts.
a. The ATS: The Rise and Fall of the Statute
The United States, through the ATS, was the dominant
jurisdiction in the field of transnational business and human rights
litigation for a number of years. Already the subject of voluminous
scholarship, the ATS of 1789 grants district courts original
jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.”68 Thus, and uniquely so, it links public international law to
tort law. In the landmark case of Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,69 the “flagrant
disregard of basic human rights and particularly the right to be free
of torture” was found to be actionable under the ATS, ushering in a
new era of human rights litigation.70 In 1997, in a case concerning
alleged corporate complicity in serious human rights violations
including forced labor, extrajudicial killings, torture, and rape
suffered by the plaintiffs at the hands of the Burmese military in
connection with the construction of a natural gas pipeline in Burma,
it was held for the first time that the courts have authority to
adjudicate claims against corporations and their executive officers
under the ATS, and that corporations and their executive officers
could be held liable for violating norms of customary international
law.71 This litigation, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., marked the beginning of

67
308 F. Supp. 3d 812 (D. Del. 2018), vacated and remanded, 765 F. App’x 811
(3d Cir. 2019).
68
Alien’s Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
69
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
70 Id. at 890.
71
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003). Note that when this
question came before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), the court dismissed the claim
because it interpreted customary international law as being inapplicable to
corporations. The decision was the subject of an appeal to the Supreme Court
which went on to address a different question, namely whether courts may
recognize causes of action for violations of international law within the territory of
a country other than the U.S. In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018), the
Supreme Court was split on whether corporations can be liable under the ATS.
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a trend of suing corporations under the ATS that saw about 180
claims filed by 2013.72
The contemporary use of the ATS was first reviewed by the
Supreme Court not in a business and human rights case, but in
litigation alleging the forcible abduction of a murder suspect: Sosa
v. Álvarez-Machain.73 The judgment in Sosa, acknowledging foreign
relations concerns that call for judicial restraint in ATS litigation,
affirmed the recent ATS case law but emphasized, inter alia, that only
a “narrow set of violations”—those “threatening serious
consequences in international affairs”—could be invoked under the
statute.74
When the Supreme Court reviewed the contemporary use of the
ATS for a second time, in the business and human rights case Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., it curtailed the reach of the statute
dramatically.75 The corporate defendants, Royal Dutch Petroleum
(the Anglo Dutch parent company) and Shell Petroleum
Development Company (its Nigerian subsidiary), were accused of
being instrumental in the actions of the Nigerian military against
protesters in the Niger Delta.76 Violations of jus cogens were among
the allegations.77 The case was rejected in the district court and on
72
For a full list of ATS cases where at least one defendant is a corporate entity,
see Goldhaber, supra note 14, at 137-49 (list compiled by Jonathan Drimmer). For a
breakdown of “where they are filed, against whom, and why,” see Jonathan C.
Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and Out-of-Court
Tactics in Transitional Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456, 461-464 (2011).
73
542 U.S. 692 (2004).
74 Id. at 715. The Court ruled that the ATS is a jurisdictional act, which does
not create a cause of action based on customary international law but entitles
plaintiffs to bring actions in court for the violation of customary international law
on the basis of a common law cause of action in tort. Lower courts were urged to
exercise “great caution” in cases that raised risks of adverse foreign policy
consequences. Id. at 694.
75
569 U.S. 108 (2013); see Robert C. Bird, Daniel R. Cahoy & Lucien J. Dhooge,
Corporate Voluntarism and Liability for Human Rights in the Post-Kiobel World, 102 KY.
L.J. 601 (2013). There was no challenge to personal jurisdiction. A companion case,
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002), alleging similar facts but brought by different plaintiffs,
had been successfully settled prior to Kiobel. In this litigation, the court accepted
subject-matter jurisdiction over the majority of the claims and dismissed the
defense of forum non conveniens. The federal court indicated in this preliminary
decision that SPDC was the alter ego of the defendant parent corporation. JOSEPH,
supra note 29, at 130.
76 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 113.
77
Id. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a jus cogens norm
as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
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appeal. It came to the Supreme Court following a decision of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that corporations could
not be held liable for violations of customary international law, and
thus could not be sued under the ATS.78 Unexpectedly, however,
the Supreme Court asked for additional argument on whether and
in what circumstances the ATS could be applied to conduct outside
the United States.79
The judgment turned on whether the presumption against
extraterritoriality of federal statute-law based claims applied to the
ATS and, if so, how it should be applied in the particular case. The
majority opinion in the Court held that the principles that underlie
the presumption against extraterritoriality should indeed apply
under the ATS80 because of “the danger of unwarranted judicial
interference in the conduct of foreign policy.”81 The Court found
nothing in the text of the ATS that evinced “the requisite clear
indication of extraterritoriality.”82 The Court clarified, however,
that, in some circumstances, a claim might have sufficient ties with
the United States to dislodge the presumption. Where claims “touch
and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient
force” they will “displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application,” even if they arise outside of the United States.83 This
touch and concern standard was not met in Kiobel, however, in
which violations occurred outside of U.S. territory and the corporate
defendants were foreign too. The outcome of Kiobel came as a blow
to corporate accountability advocates. Up until that point, most, if
not all, ATS cases against corporate defendants concerned harmful
events that occurred overseas. The decision in Kiobel that the
principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality
apply to the ATS therefore represented a sea-change in the

whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
78
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
79
Lyle Denniston, Kiobel to be Expanded and Reargued, SCOTUSblog (Mar. 5,
2012),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/kiobel-to-be-reargued/
[https://perma.cc/S4Y5-PNSM].
80
Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124-25.
81 Id. at 116.
82 Id. at 119.
83 Id. at 124-25.
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interpretation of the statute,84 and provoked doomsday predictions
about the future of ATS litigation.85
Kiobel has not quite been the “death knell” to ATS human rights
litigation that some predicted, however.86 In the years since the
decision, some courts—albeit a minority—have allowed ATS
litigation to proceed, finding that the claims touch and concern the
United States with sufficient force,87 but there has been
inconsistency among the circuits in their application of the touch
and concern test, resulting in different outcomes for plaintiffs. These
applications vary from requiring that the alleged violations of
customary international law took place in the United States,88 to a
more fact-based inquiry looking at different aspects of the case
including the citizenship of the defendants and potential U.S.
national interests triggered by the nature of the defendants’
conduct.89
Proving that the alleged violation of customary
international law took place in the United States is very challenging
for plaintiffs in transnational business and human rights litigation,

84
See Beth Stephens, Extraterritoriality and Human Rights After Kiobel, 28 MD.
J. INT’L L. 256 (2013).
85
See Matteo M. Winkler, What Remains of the Alien Tort Statute after Kiobel, 39
N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 171, 172-173 (2013).
86
Id. at 172. An example of a case that was dismissed on the basis of Kiobel is
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 192 (2d Cir. 2013). See William S. Dodge,
Business and Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Before and After Kiobel, in
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE 244, 250 (Dorothée
Baumann-Pauly & Justine Nolan eds., 2016); Jennifer M. Green, The Rule of Law at a
Crossroad: Enforcing Corporate Responsibility in International Investment Through the
Alien Tort Statute, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1085 (2014). The Institute for Legal Reform
tracks the status of ATS litigation against U.S. companies after the Supreme Court’s
Kiobel decision and reports that of forty cases that were pending at the time of Kiobel,
only 13% have been allowed to proceed on the merits. See INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL
REFORM, LAWSUITS AGAINST CORPORATIONS UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 3,
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Lawsuits_Against_C
orporations_Under_the_Alien_Tort_Statute_.pdf [https://perma.cc/R43Q-766G].
87
Dodge, supra note 86, at 250 (citing Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc.,
758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014)); see also Doe I v. Nestlé, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D.
Cal. 2010), vacated by 738 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2013).
88 See Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 194-97 (5th Cir.
2017).
89 See Doe v. Drummond Co., Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 595-96 (11th Cir. 2015)
(describing the U.S. citizenship of defendants and the allegation that the defendants
funded an organization designated by the Department of State as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization as relevant to the “touch and concern” inquiry, but
insufficient on their own to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality).
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but the more fact-based inquiry is a significant hurdle, too.90 Some
respite for plaintiffs has come in a decision of the Ninth Circuit,
which refined the requirement that the alleged violations of
international law take place in the United States, holding that the
“focus” of the ATS (a test from the case RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European
Cmty.91) was not limited to the principal offenses but also to aiding
and abetting. 92
Other challenges for ATS plaintiffs have arisen. First, case law
development in the law on personal jurisdiction over corporate
defendants has had the effect of restricting the ability of plaintiffs to
sue foreign corporations, impacting ATS cases in particular.93
Pursuant to these cases, in nearly all circumstances, a corporation
must be headquartered or incorporated in the forum state to be sued
there.94 This hurdle for plaintiffs was solidified in ATS cases with
the prohibition against suing foreign corporations under this statute
that was instituted in Jesner v. Arab Bank.95 Second, and of even
greater concern to corporate accountability advocates, the question
of whether corporations can be held liable for violations of
customary international law resurfaced in Jesner.96 The Justices left
this issue unresolved, leaving the door open to defendants to
challenge corporate liability under the ATS in subsequent cases,97
with success on at least one occasion.98 The Supreme Court recently
heard argument on this question in the case of Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe
I,99 a class action claim by Malian child plaintiffs allegedly trafficked
90 See Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 660 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2289
(2017); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528-29 (4th Cir. 2014).
91
136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016).
92
Doe I v. Nestlé, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018), amended by 929 F.3d 623
(9th Cir. 2019). This decision is the subject of an appeal to the Supreme Court:
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I, 141 S.Ct. 188 (2020).
93 See Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Reconciling Transnational Jurisdiction: A
Comparative Approach to Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporate Defendants in U.S.
Courts, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1243 (2018); Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Reforming
International Human Rights Litigation against Corporate Defendants after Jesner v. Arab
Bank, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 757 (2019).
94
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
95
138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
96 Id. at 1400; see William S. Dodge, Corporate Liability Under the US Alien Tort
Statute: A Comment on Jesner v. Arab Bank, 4 BUS & HUM. RTS. J. 131 (2019).
97
Id. at 1402. See Doe I v. Nestlé, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018), amended
by 929 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2019); Estate of Alvarez v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 275 F.
Supp. 3d 670 (D. Md. 2017).
98
Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 3d 76 (D.D.C. 2019).
99
141 S. Ct. 188 (2020).
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by cocoa growers into Côte D’Ivoire and forced to work in farms that
supplied cocoa beans to defendants.100 The Trump Administration
supported the defendant companies by arguing in an amicus brief
that corporate liability is precluded under the ATS.101
The preceding paragraphs have described the hurdles that ATS
plaintiffs now face. Even prior to the seismic changes brought about
by the Supreme Court decisions, ATS cases faced significant
challenges and were dismissed for a number of different reasons,102
the corporate veil among them.103 In Sinaltrainal v. Coca Cola Co.,104
for instance, the district court rejected the plaintiffs’ allegations of an
agency relationship between Coca Cola USA and Coca Cola
Colombia, its wholly owned subsidiary, and thus rejected the claim
against the American company. Although the jurisdictional veil is
now the most significant hurdle for plaintiffs, the focus on the
wrongful actions of the U.S.-based parent company that the
Supreme Court decisions require brings to the fore corporate veil
questions as well, in particular how the parent company can be held
liable in a given case. As with the direct liability line of cases, the
parent’s contribution to the overseas harm is under the spotlight.
Before looking at the question of attributing liability to the parent
company, the next section will track conventional tort litigation of
business and human rights claims in the United States, the parallel
trend to ATS litigation.

100 Oral Argument – Audio: Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED
STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2020/19-416
[https://perma.cc/RPA5-CMQ7].
101
This was a reversal of the Trump administration’s earlier position on this
issue. See William S. Dodge, Trump Administration Reverses Position on Corporate
Liability
Under
Alien
Tort
Statute,
JUST SEC.
(June
1,
2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/70512/trump-administration-reverses-position-oncorporate-liability-under-alien-tort-statute [https://perma.cc/2QEC-6CA7].
102
David Nersessian describes how some cases were dismissed for reasons
related to the jurisdictional veil, such as judicial comity. DAVID NERSESSIAN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES 112 (2016) (“Comity
encompasses ‘the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal approaches the
resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states.’”
(citing Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522,
543 n. 27 (1987))).
103
Skinner, supra note 42, at 1804 n.120 (listing a number of such cases).
104
578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/1

2021]

Parent Company Direct Liability

541

b. Conventional Tort Litigation
Since the 1990s, a number of conventional tort claims based on
transitory tort theory105 have been brought before the U.S. federal
and occasionally state courts against parent companies, seeking to
attribute liability to them for harm that has occurred overseas
through the operations of their subsidiaries. One of the earliest cases
was the Bhopal litigation introduced above.106 The number of
conventional tort claims increased with the ascendency of the ATS,
as ATS cases routinely include parallel state law claims in the federal
courts.107 Plaintiffs also sometimes present state law claims parallel
to ATS litigation, but in state courts. In Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,108
discussed above,109 the plaintiffs re-filed their pendent state law
claim in the state court after the ATS claims were dismissed. The
case settled prior to the start of the state court trial.110 In another
such case, the plaintiffs sought damages in tort law for personal
injuries suffered as a result of Chevron/Texaco’s operations in the
Niger Delta, in the federal court, in parallel with an ATS claim.111 In
the period since the advent of ATS litigation against corporate
defendants, conventional tort claims have also been filed without
accompanying ATS claims,112 although this is a relatively infrequent
occurrence. Not nearly as visible as ATS litigation in the academic
literature, certain scholars, including Svetlana Nagiel, have
commented on this trend of conventional tort litigation against
105
See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, State Courts and Transitory Torts in
Transnational Human Rights Cases, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 81, 83-87 (2013).
106
In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984,
634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
107
See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93–94 (2d Cir.
2000) (arising from the same set of facts as Kiobel and alleging both state and foreign
tort law violations); Jonathan Drimmer, Resurrection Ecology and the Evolution of the
Corporate Alien Tort Movement, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 989 (2012) (discussing the birth and
rise of the corporate ATS movement).
108
See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
109
See supra Part III.A.
110
Rachel Chambers, The Unocal Settlement: Implications for the Developing Law
on Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 14, 14 (2005).
111
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 22, 2006) (allowing Nigerian plaintiffs’ claim against Chevron for negligence
and intentional torts relating to Chevron’s response to rebels’ taking of an oil
platform in Nigeria to proceed to trial, which resulted in a jury verdict for the
defendants).
112 See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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corporate defendants. Nagiel argued that state statutory and
common law causes of action were viable alternatives to the ATS for
wrongs committed outside the United States.113
With the restrictions placed on the use of the ATS in Kiobel, there
was renewed interest among the academy in state common law tort
claims as a vehicle for transnational business and human rights
litigation.114 The predicted increase in conventional tort litigation of
business and human rights cases in the wake of the Kiobel decision
has not occurred, however.115 In fact, there are only isolated

113
Svetlana Meyerzon Nagiel, Note, An Overlooked Gateway to Victim
Compensation: How States Can Provide a Forum for Human Rights Claims, 46 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 133, 165 (2007); see also Drimmer, supra note 107, at 992-95 (recording
the conventional tort litigation trend).
114
See generally Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights
Cases under State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9 (2013) (arguing that,
as long as a state court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, that court
would generally have jurisdiction to hear claims arising out of human rights
violations in a foreign state and setting out various advantages and disadvantages
of litigating in state courts as compared to federal claims litigated in federal courts);
Alford, supra note 13 (arguing that the most likely avenue for plaintiffs post Kiobel
would be pleading violations of state or foreign tort laws); Nora Mardirossian,
Direct Parental Negligence Liability: An Expanding Means to Hold Parent Companies
Accountable for the Human Rights Impacts of Their Foreign Subsidiaries 6 (2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2607592 [https://perma.cc/372P-DNE3] (“[R]eturning
to this conventional tort litigation under state law may be a more viable option for
victims seeking redress.”); Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute,
Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 744–49
(2012) (analyzing issues of federalism, choice of law, preemption, and due process
that the author predicts will arise as part of the post-ATS wave of transnational
litigation in state courts); Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to
Judicial Remedies for Violations of International Human Rights Norms by Transnational
Corporations in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 200
(2014) (arguing that the decision in Kiobel likely meant that many cases brought
against businesses for their role in human rights abuses abroad would be brought
under state law in either state courts or in federal courts under diversity
jurisdiction). On various aspects of the broad trend, see Symposium, Human Rights
Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013).
Introducing a non-U.S. perspective to the post Kiobel debate, Robert McCorquodale
charted the foreign direct liability trend outside the United States and argued that
this might reignite claims in the United States on non-ATS bases. Robert
McCorquodale, Waving Not Drowning: Kiobel Outside the United States, 107 AM. J.
INT’L. L 846, 851 (2013).
115
The author surveyed the websites of the key civil society organizations that
litigate corporate accountability cases. These organizations are: Earthrights
International, the Center for Constitutional Rights and the Center for Justice and
Accountability. The author used the Corporate Legal Accountability resources
from the Business and Human Rights Resource Center website and legal databases
Nexis Uni and HeinOnline.
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examples of new conventional tort law cases,116 essentially a
continuation of the pre Kiobel state of affairs. The difference post
Kiobel is that fewer ATS cases are being brought,117 meaning fewer
opportunities for parallel conventional tort claims.
As with ATS litigation, the hurdles for plaintiffs in conventional
tort claims relate both to the corporate veil and the jurisdictional
veil. Looking first at conventional tort claims, a number of early
examples from the 1990s prior to the advent of ATS litigation,
including the Bhopal litigation introduced above, were dismissed by
the courts on forum non conveniens grounds.118 Related to the
jurisdictional veil, under this doctrine the court dismisses a case on
the basis that another forum—usually the host state—is more
“convenient” for the litigation.119 The corporate veil has featured as
a reason for dismissal in more recent conventional tort cases. One
example is Gomez v. Dole Food Co., which was dismissed in 2012
because of the plaintiffs’ failure to properly plead alter ego and to
join Dole’s Colombian subsidiary, a necessary and proper party to
the litigation.120 Another example is Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,121
which concerns the contractual veil rather than the corporate veil.
The plaintiffs presented four distinct legal theories to support their
argument that Wal-Mart’s Standards for Suppliers and California
common law provide substantive obligations that can be enforced
by foreign workers in the Wal-Mart supply chain against Wal-Mart,
including the negligent breach of duty to monitor suppliers and
protect the plaintiffs from the suppliers’ working conditions.122 In
dismissing the case, the court rejected all four theories.
When conventional tort claims are brought alongside ATS
claims, with some exceptions, their fate seems to be linked to that of
116
See, e.g., Acuña-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp., 308 F. Supp. 3d 812 (D.
Del. 2018), vacated and remanded, 765 F. App’x 811 (3d Cir. 2019); Kashef v. BNP
Paribas S.A., 442 F. Supp. 3d 809 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Kashef is not about attributing
liability to the parent company for its role in the wrongdoing of an affiliate
company.
117
See supra note 114.
118
Drimmer, supra note 107, at 993 (citing Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 965
F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex.
1995)).
119
SKINNER, MCCORQUODALE & DE SCHUTTER, supra note 38, at 25.
120
No. B228876, 2011 WL 5085007, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2011).
121
572 F.3d 677, 683-84 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Madeleine Conway, A New
Duty of Care? Tort Liability from Voluntary Human Rights Due Diligence in Global
Supply Chains, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 741, 774-77 (2015).
122 Walmart, 572 F.3d 677.
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the ATS claim. Only a few parallel claims remain intact post Kiobel
and Jesner. One such case is Doe I v. Exxon Mobile Corp., discussed
above. The ATS claims were dismissed in June 2019 but the
conventional tort claims for wrongful death; battery; assault;
arbitrary arrest, detention, and false imprisonment; and negligence
remain.123 These claims are governed by Indonesian law.124
Likewise in Doe v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., claims under the ATS
were dismissed, leaving only claims under Colombian law, which
were due to be heard in the Southern District Court of Florida in
October 2019.125 Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I, also discussed above, is
on-going both as an ATS claim and under California state law.126 As
noted there, the focus of court decisions thus far in this matter is the
viability of the ATS claim.127 Al-Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc.,
is on-going both under the ATS and as a conventional tort law claim,
again the current focus of the courts being the viability of the ATS
claim.128 In summary, there are only a few transnational business
and human rights cases—both ATS and conventional tort law—
currently before the U.S. courts. The difficulty attributing liability
to parent corporations is one of the reasons such cases are dismissed.
c. Overcoming the Corporate Veil
As seen in the preceding sections, the corporate veil is a hurdle
to plaintiffs in both ATS and conventional tort litigation. There are
two aspects to proving liability of the parent company in ATS
litigation: the first is imputing liability to the parent company when
the wrongdoer is a subsidiary company, the second is proving the
parent company liable as primary violator of customary
international law norm, or under secondary liability concepts such
as aiding and abetting.129 Imputing liability to the parent company,
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 3d 76, 78 (D.D.C. 2019).
Id. This means that U.S. law on attributing liability to parent companies
will not be applied.
125
No. CV 07-3406 (JMV), 2018 WL 497322 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 2018).
126
141 S. Ct. 188 (2020).
127
Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528-30 (4th Cir. 2014).
128
Id. This is also the position in Adhikari v. KBR Inc., No. 4:16-CV-2478, 2017
WL 4237923 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 25, 2017) (Adhikari II).
129
Douglas M. Branson, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable?
Achilles’ Heels in Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 227, 241
123
124

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/1

2021]

Parent Company Direct Liability

545

the focus here, can be achieved in different ways: piercing the
corporate veil; under agency theory; or under enterprise liability
theory.130 There is no clear precedent on whether state law or federal
common law applies to determine derivative liability by which the
faults of the subsidiary can be attributed to the parent in ATS
litigation, however.131 In Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., a key
precedent in this field, the judge applied federal common law.132
Likewise in the Unocal litigation, discussed above, federal common
law was applied to determine the question of attributing liability to
the U.S. parent corporation.133 In contrast, in Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.134 the district court judge applied the
conflicts of law regime of the forum, New York, to determine which
state’s law would apply to the question of piercing the corporate
veil.135 The situation is more straightforward when conventional
tort claims are litigated in state courts, because plaintiffs have only
one of these challenges: to impute liability to the parent company.
The law that will be applied to determine parent company liability
may be that of the state where suit is brought or, depending on the
conflicts of law of the forum, foreign law. Assuming U.S. law
applies, the parent company can be made liable by piercing the
corporate veil under agency theory or under enterprise liability
theory.

(2011). The test for accessory liability (aiding and abetting) under the ATS has been
approached in different ways by different circuits. The first question is whether the
law to apply to determine accessory liability is international law or federal common
law. There is now settled case law establishing that international law is applicable.
See Srish Khakurel, The Circuit Split on Mens Rea for Aiding and Abetting Liability
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 59 B.C.L. REV. 2953, 2966 (2018).
130
The third, enterprise liability, is advocated by certain scholars; for example,
Meredith Dearborn argued that enterprise liability should be reconsidered for torts
committed by corporate groups. Meredith Dearborn, Enterprise Liability: Reviewing
and Revitalizing Liability for Corporate Groups, 97 CAL. L. REV. 195 (2009); see also
Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate Groups: Does Corporate Law
Reach Human Rights? 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 101 (2013).
131
SIMON BAUGHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CORPORATE WRONGS: CLOSING THE
GOVERNANCE GAP 155-56 (2015).
132 Id.
133
Id. at 156. Federal common law was also applied in In re South African
Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
134
453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
135
BAUGHEN, supra note 131, at 156.
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d. Acuña-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp.
A recent case, Acuña-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp.,136 is
emblematic of the approach adopted by plaintiffs to attribute
liability to parent companies in transnational business and human
rights litigation. This is a rare example in such litigation of plaintiffs
suing the American parent corporation in tort law in the federal
court, with no parallel ATS claim. It is relevant to this Article
because the plaintiffs seek to attribute liability to the parent
company for wrongdoing ostensibly at the hands of the
subsidiary.137 The plaintiffs are subsistence farmers who live in the
rural highlands of Cajamarca, Peru. The plot of land where they
have cultivated crops and raised livestock for over 20 years, called
Tragadero Grande, is claimed by the corporation as part of the site
of a planned gold mine. The plaintiffs allege that the corporation
has instituted a campaign of harassment against them since 2011 in
an attempt to oust them from Tragadero Grande. Specific
allegations against the company and its security contractors include
intimidation, assault, surveillance, trespass, and unlawful
detainment.138
The plaintiffs have sued the American parent company,
Newmont Mining Corp., and three of its American subsidiaries. The
Newmont subsidiary operating the mine in Peru, a company called
Minera Yanacocha (“M.Y.”), is not a defendant in the proceedings.
Security at the planned Conga mine site was provided via a contract
between M.Y. and Swedish firm Securitas, and via a memorandum
of understanding between M.Y. and the Peruvian National Police.139
The plaintiffs assert that security operations were carried out with
the full approval and knowledge of the Newmont Mining Corp. by
showing, for instance, how employees that control the security
procedures of M.Y. are current or former employees of the parent
No. 17-1315, 2020 WL 1154783 (D. Del. Mar. 10, 2020).
In Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2019), the allegations
are made directly against the parent company as well as against a subsidiary
company.
138
The formal charges are battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, intrusion on plaintiff’s physical solitude, negligence, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, trespass to chattels, and conversion. See Complaint for Damages
and Equitable Relief at 79-89, Acuña-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp., 308 F.
Supp. 3d 812 (D. Del. 2017) (No. 17-1315).
139 Id. ¶¶ 183-211.
136
137
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company.140 They therefore assert liability against the parent
company primarily by attempting to show that M.Y. is its agent, and
that the alleged torts were within the course and scope of the
agency.141 As an alternative line of argument, which is far less
developed in the case papers, the plaintiffs make an allegation that
resembles “direct liability” used in the common law jurisdiction
cases: they allege that the defendants are directly liable for negligent
supervision of mine security.142
These arguments have not yet been tested in court. As
commonly occurs in transnational tort litigation, the defendants
challenged the plaintiffs’ decision to sue in the United States,
arguing that Peru is the appropriate forum for the case to be heard.
The most recent decision in the litigation is that of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, which ruled that the case should be heard in
Peru.143 The arguments deployed in the Acuña-Atalaya litigation are
illustrative of the approach adopted by plaintiffs to attribute liability
to parent companies in transnational business and human rights
litigation.
i.

Veil Piercing / Enterprise Liability

The plaintiffs in Acuña-Atalaya argue that the Peruvian
subsidiary, M.Y., is the corporate defendant’s alter ego, or in other
words, that the corporate veil should be pierced.144 Piercing the
corporate veil is very difficult to achieve in practice, essentially
requiring an extremely high degree of control over the activities of
the subsidiary such that the subsidiary has no separate identity of
its own.145 In the key precedent on this question, Bowoto v. Chevron
Id. ¶ 212-20.
Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 10-11, AcuñaAtalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp., 308 F. Supp. 3d 812 (D. Del. 2017) (No. 17-1315)
[hereinafter Acuña-Atalaya Brief in Support of Motion].
142 Id. at 18.
143
Acuna-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp, No. 20-1765 (3d Cir. filed Dec.
11, 2020); see also Kate Fried, U.S. Federal Appeals Court Rules that Maxima Acuña
Atalaya’s Case Against Newmont Mining Corporation Should be Heard in Peru,
EARTHRIGHTS INTERNATIONAL (Dec. 14, 2020), https://earthrights.org/media/u-sfederal-appeals-court-rules-that-maxima-acuna-atalayas-case-against-newmont-m
ining-corporation-should-be-heard-in-peru/ [https://perma.cc/BN3G-Y4TJ].
144
Id.
145
See Blumberg, supra note 39, at 304-07; see generally supra Part II (discussing
the corporate veil).
140
141
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Texaco Corp., the allegation was that Chevron’s Nigerian subsidiary,
Chevron Nigeria Ltd. (CNL), recruited the Nigerian military and
police to fire on protesters on an oil platform, and provided them
with transportation from which they launched this and a second
attack on a Nigerian village.146 The issue before the court was
whether the parent company could be liable for the acts of its
subsidiary. The judge held that the alter ego theory did not apply
on the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, because the plaintiffs could not
show that the subsidiary was a mere instrumentality of the parent
company.147 Reflecting the challenge of piercing the corporate veil,
the plaintiffs in Acuña-Atalaya argue alter ego as an alternative to
their primary argument, agency, and do not expand on their
argument in their brief in support of a preliminary injunction,
focusing their efforts for this application on agency only.148 Likewise
the plaintiffs argue enterprise theory as an alternative means of
attributing liability to the parent company, but do not expand on
this argument in their motion in support of a preliminary injunction,
reflecting how difficult it is to successfully use enterprise theory in
practice.149
ii.

Agency

As noted above, a parent company may be found liable in a
transnational business and human rights claim where its subsidiary
is found to have acted as its agent in respect of the particular action
giving rise to the claim.150 The test for agency does not require the
court to disregard the formalities of the corporate veil but instead,
through vicarious liability, the principal or employer is held strictly
liable for the acts or omissions of its agents that were within the
course and scope of the agency. In Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp.,
the judge, in addition to holding that the alter ego theory did not
apply, considered the question of agency.151 To support a finding of
312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1233 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
Id. at 1246-47.
148 Acuña-Atalaya Brief in Support of Motion, supra note 141, at 10-17.
149 Id.
150
See generally Ma Ji, Multinational Enterprises’ Liability for the Acts of Their
Offshore Subsidiaries: The Aftermath of Kiobel and Daimler, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV.
397 (2015) (discussing agency in the transnational business and human rights
litigation context).
151
312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
146
147
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agency, the judge found there must be “a close relationship or
domination between parent and subsidiary.”152 The act for which
liability is sought must be within the scope of the subsidiary’s
authority as agent. The court in Bowoto found evidence to support a
finding that the subsidiary, CNL, was Chevron’s agent, including
communications suggesting a close relationship regarding security,
the parent setting security policies, the parent and subsidiary
sharing officers and directors, the subsidiary’s importance to the
parent; and the parent holding the subsidiary out to be a department
of its own business.153 These last factors can be summarized in the
question: had the subsidiary engaged in activities which, but for the
subsidiary, the parent would have had to undertake itself? On the
basis of these facts, the court allowed the plaintiffs’ claim against
Chevron for negligence and intentional torts to proceed to trial,
which resulted in a jury verdict for the defendants.154 In Doe I v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., it was similarly held that a jury could conclude
that a subsidiary was the agent of its parent with regard to security
for the subsidiary’s project, where the parent “exerted significant
control over [the subsidiary’s] security, particularly through [the
parent’s] Global Security Division.”155
The plaintiffs in Acuña-Atalaya argue that M.Y. is Newmont
Mining Corp.’s agent “at least for security purposes, including
dealing with the [p]laintiffs.”156 They support this argument with
evidence showing an overlap of personnel between the companies;
the parent company setting standards and policies for M.Y.,
including on human rights and security; and parent company
control of security via a group-wide security program and reporting
structures.157 The defendant in Acuña-Atalaya argues that the
relationship between parent and subsidiary is sufficient to establish
agency only where the parent company dominates the activities of

Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1243.
154
Id. at 1250; Bowoto v. Chevron, EarthRights International,
https://earthrights.org/case/bowoto-v-chevron-2/#documentsff69-1a905f26f4b6 [https://perma.cc/6JAL-G46Q].
155
573 F. Supp. 2d 16, 31-32 (D.D.C. 2008). The court allowed the Indonesian
plaintiffs’ claims of wrongful death, theft by coercion, and assault and battery
against Exxon relating to natural gas extraction activities in Indonesia to proceed to
trial.
156 Acuña-Atalaya Brief in Support of Motion, supra note 141, at 16.
157
Id. at 16-17.
152
153
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the subsidiary that relate to the claim.158 They deny that the
plaintiffs have met the burden to establish such a relationship.159
iii.

Direct Parent Liability

Direct parental negligence liability for harm caused by a
subsidiary has yet to be established in U.S. case law.160 At least one
leading scholar contends that the United States courts may at some
point accept the direct liability argument in transnational tort
litigation, implicitly clarifying that there is no reason in principle for
courts not to do so.161 There has however been one occasion on
which the Supreme Court laid out an opportunity for parents to be
directly liable under the terms of a specific statute:
the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act, known as CERCLA.162 This was a domestic case.
Proceedings were brought under the Act against CP International
Inc. in respect of the activities of its then defunct subsidiary, Ott
Chemical Co.163 The suit was for the costs of cleaning up industrial
waste generated by the Ott Chemical Co. plant.164 The Act allowed
suit to be brought against “any person who at the time of disposal
of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which
hazardous substances were disposed of . . . .”165 The question for the
Court was whether the paper company operated the Ott Chemical
Co. plant for the purpose of the Act.166

158
Answering Brief of Defendants in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 16, Acuña-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp., 308 F.
Supp. 3d 812 (D. Del. 2017) (No. 17-1315).
159
Id. at 17.
160
Mardirossian, supra note 114, at 5.
161
Vivian Grosswald Curran argues, “[w]hen they consider arguments
rebutting the presumption against extraterritoriality, in expanding agency theory
with respect to foreign subsidiaries, and in creating a direct duty of care theory, U.S.
judges may also be more likely to take greater note of Canadian decisions such as
HudBay and Vedanta . . . .” Curran, supra note 57, at 443.
162 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 64-73 (1998) (discussing parent
liability under CERCLA).
163 Id. at 51.
164
Id. at 55.
165
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2018).
166
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 60.
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The Supreme Court held that a parent corporation could not be
found liable under CERCLA for a subsidiary’s environmental
practices merely on account of its active involvement in the
subsidiary’s general affairs.167 But the parent could be found
directly liable as an “operator” based on its management, direction,
or conduct specifically related to pollution at the facility for instance
when joint officers conducted the affairs of the subsidiary on behalf
of the parent.168 Based on this finding, the Court remanded the case
to the lower courts for re-evaluation and resolution.169 It is
noteworthy that the Supreme Court’s approach was to focus on
positive involvement by the parent company in the harmful activity
of the subsidiary that goes beyond established norms of corporate
behavior.170 Thus, as will be demonstrated below, it differs
considerably from the approach to direct liability in English law.
Ashton Philips argues that there has been one instance of direct
parent company liability in tort litigation, a case from Illinois in
which a parent company was held to be directly liable to the
employees of its subsidiary when budgetary restrictions imposed by
the parent left the subsidiary exposed to health and safety risks,
which materialized in the form of a factory fire.171 The Supreme
Court of Illinois held that “it is ‘axiomatic that every person owes to
all others a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against injury
which naturally flows as a reasonably probable and foreseeable
consequence of his act.’”172 Therefore, the parent company could be
liable as a “direct participant” for any injuries caused by its
affirmative mismanagement.173 A subsequent decision of the
Superior Court of Massachusetts disapproved of this decision,
however, doubting whether the Illinois court had correctly applied

Id. at 60-64.
Id. at 66-67.
169
Id. at 73.
170
BAUGHEN, supra note 131, at 162.
171
Ashton S. Phillips, Transnational Businesses, the Right to Safe Working
Conditions, and the Rana Plaza Building Collapse: Toward a Tort-Based Solution to the
Global Race to the Bottom, in THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE: MOVING
FORWARD, LOOKING BACK 468, 484-485 (Jena Martin & Karen E. Bravo eds., 2016)
(citing Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 274, 278, 864 N.E.2d 227, 231 (2007)).
172
Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 227, 238 (Ill. 2007) (citing Frye v.
Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E. 2d 557 (1992)).
173
Id. at 235.
167
168
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Bestfoods in adopting its theory of direct participant liability.174 As
Phillips acknowledges, the Ninth Circuit also reached a conflicting
result in the case of Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,175 discussed above.
As noted there, this case differs from the cases discussed so far in
that it concerns attributing liability to a lead company for harm to
the plaintiffs caused by a supplier, not by a subsidiary. The legal
principles that apply are arguably similar, however.176 The plaintiffs
alleged common law negligence, relating to Wal-Mart’s inadequate
monitoring of its subcontractors’ factories. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the negligence claims on
the ground that Wal-Mart “did not owe [p]laintiffs a common-law
duty to monitor Wal-Mart’s suppliers or to prevent the alleged
intentional mistreatment of plaintiffs by the suppliers.”177
Direct liability is used to make a narrow argument in AcuñaAtalaya. The plaintiffs claim that liability attaches where the
defendant is negligent in supervising an activity or in permitting, or
failing to prevent, tortious conduct by persons “upon premises or
with instrumentalities under the defendant’s control.”178 In essence,
they say that the defendants oversaw and controlled security and
knew about the ongoing intimidation at the proposed mine site yet
failed to ensure that security personnel stopped harassing plaintiffs.
The authority cited is Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., in which the plaintiffs
alleged that the subsidiary was directly liable for the negligent
supervision of Indonesian security personnel, and that the parent
company was liable for the acts of the subsidiary under various
theories, including agency.179 The court in Exxon decided that a
174
Born v. Simonds Int’l, Corp., 200602483C, WL 5905396, at *5 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Dec. 30, 2009). Courts in Illinois are following the Forsythe decision, however.
See, e.g., Deatherage v. D Transp., Inc., 4 N.E.3d 1108 (Ill. 2013).
175
572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Phillips, supra note 171, at 485.
176
See SHELDON LEADER, JANE WRIGHT & ANIL YILMAZ, LEGAL OPINION ON
ENGLISH COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES OF TORT: JABIR AND OTHERS V KIK TEXTILIEN UND
NON-FOOD GMBH (2015) [hereinafter LEGAL OPINION ON JABIR].
177
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d at 683.
178 Acuña-Atalaya Brief in Support of Motion, supra note 141, at 18 (citing Doe
v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 16, 29-30 (D.D.C. 2008)).
179

An employer conducting activity through servants or other agents is liable
for negligent supervision if the employer is negligent or reckless (1) in
giving improper or ambiguous orders or in failing to make proper
regulations; (2) in the employment of improper persons or
instrumentalities in work involving risk of harm to others; (3) in the
supervision of the activity; or (4) in permitting, or failing to prevent,
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reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the subsidiary was liable
for negligent supervision, in addition to accepting the plaintiffs’
prima facie case on agency. It therefore denied summary judgment
on this allegation.180 The difference between Exxon and AcuñaAtalaya is that the allegation of direct liability is against the parent
company in Acuña-Atalaya, which is one step removed from the
subsidiary that engaged the services of the security personnel. Thus,
this argument is potentially more difficult to sustain. More broadly,
this type of direct liability relates only to negligent supervision and
requires a higher level of oversight and control over the relevant
activity than the direct liability argument used in the English cases,
discussed in the next Part.
IV.

ENGLISH CASES: ON THE RISE

This Part tracks the rise of transnational business and human
rights litigation in England. The case analysis demonstrates that the
path of this litigation has not been smooth, with courts taking one
step forward, and two steps back. It is against this background that
the U.K. Supreme Court’s decisions in Lungowe and Okpabi provide
an important marker of the approach of the courts going forward,
giving sanction at the highest level for the direct parent company
liability to be understood through a wider lens than it has been in
certain instances in the past.
a. Background to the Tort Claims
Since the late 1990s, a number of transnational business and
human rights cases have been brought in the English High Court.
With no statutory equivalent to the ATS, these cases have been based
on the tort of negligence. They seek to impose direct liability for

negligent or other tortious conduct by persons, whether or not servants or
agents, upon premises or with instrumentalities under the person’s
control.
Exxon Mobile Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (citation omitted).
180 Id. at 30.
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actions or omissions by the parent company in respect of harm
committed abroad.181
An English case with a similar fact pattern to Acuña-Atalaya, but
in which direct liability was argued against the parent company, had
a swift and positive outcome for the plaintiffs, in contrast to the
outcome in Acuña-Atalaya. This case, Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals
PLC, was brought against a U.K.-parent company, Monterrico
Metals, and its wholly owned Peruvian subsidiary, Rio Blanco
Copper SA, concerning protests that took place in Peru about the
company’s proposal to develop a copper mine there.182 The
plaintiffs were 31 protesters and their family members who were
hooded, bound, and detained over a period of days by members of
the Peruvian National Police.183 Two women alleged that they were
sexually assaulted.184 One protester died.185 The plaintiffs’ claims
were for false imprisonment, trespass to the person (torture) and
negligence. They sought damages for the injuries inflicted upon
them by Peruvian police officers,186 instigated and aided by the mine
management.187 The plaintiffs’ contention was that officers of the
company “ought to have intervened so as to have prevented the
abuse of the [c]laimants’ human rights.”188 The parent company was
said to have exercised “effective control over the management of
181
In one of the early cases, for example, Connelly v. RTZ Corp. PLC [1997]
UKHL 30 (HL) (Eng.), a worker suffering from laryngeal cancer who had been
employed at RTZ’s uranium mine in Namibia brought such a claim. Id. ¶ 1. He
alleged that the England-based RTZ parent company took key strategic technical
and policy decisions relating to the mine. Id. ¶ 3. In particular, he alleged that RTZ
had devised the mine’s policy on health, safety and the environment and/or had
advised the mine as to the contents of the policy. Id. Thus, the foundation of the
plaintiff’s claim was that the parent company owed him a direct duty of care,
independent of the duty of care owed to him by his employer. This argument was
met with approval by the courts. Id. at 33. The House of Lords accepted that there
was an arguable case against the parent company, in a forum non conveniens
judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor. Id. ¶ 4. The action failed, however, because it had
been initiated outside the limitation period allowed by law. Id. at 21, 33.
182
See generally Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals PLC [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB)
(Eng.) (removing Rio Blanco SA as a defendant when it became clear to the
plaintiffs’ lawyers that the absence of a treaty between Peru and the United
Kingdom would make it difficult to enforce any English judicial decision.). See
Meeran, supra note 29.
183
Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals PLC [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB) ¶ 7 (Eng.)
184
Id.
185
Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. ¶ 11.
188 Id. ¶ 8.
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the” subsidiary and was therefore directly liable to the plaintiffs.189
The litigation came before a judge in the context of an application
for a freezing order to ensure that the company retained sufficient
assets in the U.K. to meet its potential liabilities in the case.190 The
application required the judge to consider whether the plaintiffs had
made out a good arguable case against the parent company, on the
basis of the parent company’s involvement described above. The
plaintiffs were successful,191 and the parties reached a financial
settlement that concluded the litigation, shortly after this application
was decided in the plaintiffs’ favor.192
The decision in Chandler v. Cape PLC193 was an important legal
milestone in the direct liability line of cases, albeit in a domestic case
concerning U.K.-based parent and subsidiary companies. This is the
only English direct liability case to have been won by the plaintiffs
following a full trial of the facts—all the other direct liability cases
have been lost or settled after court decisions on jurisdiction.194 The
trial judgment was subject to an appeal, and the Court of Appeal
affirmed the lower court’s decision that, in appropriate
circumstances, the law may impose a duty of care on a parent
company in respect of its subsidiary’s employees.195 The court set
out four indicia of the appropriate circumstances that establish the
parent’s knowledge of the potential harm to the plaintiff and the
subsidiary’s or its employees’ reliance on that knowledge for the
employees’ protection, which together formed the basis of the
parent’s duty of care.196 On the facts of the case, the court found that
the parent had assumed responsibility towards the plaintiff in
circumstances where the parent company had installed its asbestos
production business at its subsidiary’s site and maintained a certain
level of control over the business, through involvement in and
influence over its subsidiary’s operations.197 This control was
illustrated by the parent issuing instructions about company
products; the parent placing requirements on the subsidiary that it
Id.
Id. ¶ 28.
191 Id. ¶ 27.
192
Angela Lindt, Transnational Human Rights Litigation: A Means of
Obtaining Effective Remedy Abroad?, J. Legal Anthropology, Dec. 2020, at 57.
193
Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA Civ. 525 (Eng.).
194
See id. ¶ 2.
195 Id. 80-81.
196
Id. ¶ 80.
197 Id. ¶ 79.
189
190
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seek approval before incurring capital expenditures; the parent’s
centralized product development process; and its common
company policies.198 The finding of a direct duty of care on the
parent company has been relied on as precedent in a series of
subsequent cases, discussed next.
b. The Current Wave of Litigation
There has been a steadily growing trickle of tort cases against
transnational corporations in the English courts, boosted by Chandler
and also by legal developments at the European level. In 2005, a
decision of the European Court of Justice clarified that under the
relevant European law,199 national courts of European states do not
have the power to dismiss cases brought against European
defendants on the grounds that a court of a non-European state
would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action (i.e.,
on forum non conveniens grounds).200 Following this judgment, a
handful of transnational business and human rights cases were
brought in which, unable to avail themselves of the defense of forum
non conveniens, corporate defendants did not challenge jurisdiction
of the English courts, at least not over the English parent
company.201 In these cases, both the English parent company and
the foreign subsidiary were sued. The joining of the foreign
company as co-defendant in connected claims was also made
possible under the relevant European law.202
198
Martin Petrin, Assumption of Responsibility in Corporate Groups: Chandler v
Cape PLC, 76 MODERN L. REV. 603, 612 (2013). The judgment in a subsequent case,
Thompson v. Renwick Group [2014] EWCA Civ. 635 (Eng.), confirmed that a
plaintiff would have had to show that the parent company was better placed,
through superior knowledge or expertise, to protect its subsidiary’s employees
against the risk of injury that materialized. In contrast, the parent company merely
holding shares in the subsidiary did not satisfy the test.
199
Brussels Regulation, supra note 51.
200
Owusu v. Jackson [2005] ECR 1383 (Eng.). This position is now changed
since the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. See Ekaterina Aristova,
The Future of Tort Litigation against Transnational Corporations in the English Courts: Is
For [Non] Conveniens Back?, BUS. HUM. RTS. J., May 21, 2021, at 1.
201
See, e.g., Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals PLC [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB)
(Eng.); Bodo Cmty. v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nigeria [2014] EWHC 958 (TCC)
(Eng.); Kesabo v. African Barrick Gold PLC [2013] EWHC 3198 (QB) (Eng.).
202
Brussels Regulation, supra note 51, art. 8. Member states’ domestic laws
apply when the defendant corporation in the connected claim is domiciled outside
the European Union.
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Then came a shift in tactics. Corporate defendants began to
challenge jurisdiction by arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiffs in
these cases did not have an arguable case against the domestically
domiciled corporate defendant (usually the parent company) also
known as the “anchor defendant” (because this defendant anchors
the claim in the jurisdiction). The test for jurisdiction over the parent
company is premised on there being “between the claimant and the
defendant a real issue which it is reasonable for the court to try.”203
A “real issue to be tried” equates to an arguable case. The arguable
case that the plaintiffs have sought to establish is of direct liability
of the domestic defendant. A trilogy of recent cases illustrates the
different approaches the courts have taken when they identify
features relevant to deciding whether a parent company owes a duty
of care to the plaintiffs, and thus whether there is an arguable case
against the domestic defendant.204 These cases represent the cutting
edge of the law on direct parent liability. Although the applicable
law in each of these cases is the law of the jurisdiction where the
harm occurred (Zambia, Nigeria, and Kenya respectively), the
relevant countries are common law jurisdictions, which draw on
foreign law as precedent, including English law, in novel cases such
as these. When viewed as a trilogy, the importance of Lungowe, the
case discussed first, becomes apparent.
i.

Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources PLC

This case concerns the impact of pollution from a copper mine
in Zambia that is operated by Konkola Copper Mines (“KCM”), the
Zambian subsidiary of U.K.-parent company Vedanta Resources.
The plaintiffs, 1,826 Zambian citizens, allege that they have suffered
personal injury, damage to property, loss of income, and loss of
amenity and enjoyment of land arising out of the operation of the
203 U.K. Ministry of Justice, Practice Direction 6B—Service Out of Jurisdiction
§ 3.1(3)(a). If there is a “real issue . . . for the court to try” the plaintiffs must still
overcome the forum non conveniens hurdle in relation to the foreign subsidiary, but
the fact that there is a properly pleaded case against the parent company domiciled
in the jurisdiction is indicative that England is the appropriate forum. Id., Vedanta
Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, ¶ 13 (Eng.). The precedent on forum
non conveniens is beyond the scope of this Article.
204
See Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, ¶ 13 (Eng.);
Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2021] UKSC 3 (Eng.); AAA v. Unilever PLC
[2018] EWCA (Civ) 1532 (Eng.).
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mine.205 They make a direct claim of negligence against Vedanta,
alleging that it breached the duty of care it owed them to ensure that
KCM’s mining operations did not cause harm to the environment or
local communities.206 They also claim against KCM.207
To establish Vedanta’s direct liability, the plaintiffs had to
demonstrate that they had an arguable case that Vedanta owed a
duty of care to affected local communities in the area of the mine,
and that they breached this duty through their actions and/or
omissions. Such a duty of care has only been established once at
trial, in Chandler, discussed above. The judge’s conclusion that the
plaintiffs in Lungowe had established an arguable case of Vedanta’s
direct liability was premised on four pieces of evidence: Vedanta’s
sustainability report; the management agreement between Vedanta
and KCM; a decision of an Irish court about the structure of the
Vedanta corporate group; and the witness statement of a former
KCM employee (a whistle-blower).208 These pointed towards there
being a duty of care between the parent company and the
plaintiffs.209
After the company appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of
Appeal,210 the case reached the U.K. Supreme Court in January
2019.211 The company sought to persuade the court that finding a
duty of care on the part of the parent company would involve a
novel extension of common law tort, beyond the boundaries of any
established category.212 The court disagreed. Giving judgment,
Lord Briggs held that the critical question determining whether
there was an arguable case against Vedanta, was “whether Vedanta
sufficiently intervened in the management of the Mine owned by its
205

(Eng.).

See Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources PLC [2016] EWHC 975, ¶ 1 (TCC)

Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
208
Id. ¶ 119.
209
See Caparo Indus. PLC v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) (Eng.) (applying
the test for determining new tortious duties of care). “Proximity” is one of the tests
from Caparo Industries for determining new tortious duties of care. The Supreme
Court disapproved of this approach on appeal, however, finding that it was not a
new tortious duty of care that the plaintiffs sought to establish. See Vedanta
Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, ¶ 60 (Eng.).
210
Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources PLC [2017] EWCA Civ. 1528 (Eng.). See
also Ekaterina Aristova, Tort Litigation against Transnational Corporations in the
English Courts: The Challenge of Jurisdiction, UTRECHT L. REV., June 2018, at 6 (tracing
the life of the case).
211
Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20 (Eng.).
212
Id. ¶ 46.
206
207
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subsidiary KCM to have incurred, itself (rather than by vicarious
liability), a common law duty of care to the [plaintiffs].”213 There
was “nothing special or conclusive about the bare parent/subsidiary
relationship”214—“the general principles which determine whether
A owes a duty of care to C in respect of the actions of B are not novel
at all.”215
The court made it clear that the four indicia from Chandler must
not be used formulaically to determine if there is a duty of care.216
Taking a more pragmatic approach to the arrangements of
multinational corporate groups, it noted that “[t]here is no limit to
the models of management and control which may be put in place
within a multinational group of companies.”217 “Everything
depends on the extent to which, and the way in which, the parent
availed itself of the opportunity to take over, intervene in, control,
supervise or advise the management of the relevant operations . . .
of the subsidiary.”218 This is important because one of the other
cases in the trilogy (AAA v. Unilever) failed on the basis that the
plaintiffs could not convincingly make a case on the facts that the
parent company exercised sufficient control and that the foreign
subsidiary relied on that control.219 The careful use of the
terminology of “intervention” rather than “control” in Lungowe is
striking.220
Lord Briggs did not conduct the factual analysis of whether
sufficient intervention had taken place, which had already been
done by the lower court. He noted however that had he done so, the
parent company’s published materials, such as its sustainability
report asserting its responsibility for laying down and
implementing standards of environmental control at the mine, were
“sufficient on their own to show that it is well arguable that a
sufficient level of intervention by Vedanta in the conduct of
operations at the Mine may be demonstrable at trial.”221 The
Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, ¶ 44 (Eng.).
Id. ¶ 54.
215 Id.
216 Id. ¶¶ 59-60.
217 Id. ¶ 51. The approach adopted in Okpabi and AAA, discussed below, of
categorizing the kind of case in which the parent might incur a duty of care to third
parties harmed by the activities of the subsidiary was not adopted in Lungowe. Id.
218 Id. ¶ 49.
219
AAA v. Unilever PLC [2018] EWCA Civ 1532, ¶ 40 (Eng.).
220
Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, ¶ 59 (Eng.).
221 Id. ¶ 61.
213
214
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defendants had sought to argue a general principle that a parent
could never incur a duty of care in respect of the activities of a
particular subsidiary merely by laying down group-wide policies
and guidelines and expecting the management of each subsidiary to
comply with them. The court rejected this argument:
[T]he parent may incur the relevant responsibility to third
parties if, in published materials, it holds itself out as exercising
that degree of supervision and control of its subsidiaries, even if
it does not in fact do so. In such circumstances its very omission
may constitute the abdication of a responsibility which it has
publicly undertaken.222
This represents an extension of Chandler to the situation where a
company makes representations about supervision of its subsidiary
but omits to act on them.223 It also attributes a new legal significance
to the content of group-wide policies and reports. Almost two years
after the Supreme Court judgment, the litigation ended with a
settlement agreement being reached between the parties.224
ii.

Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC

Okpabi and its companion case are parallel claims brought on
behalf of the inhabitants of two communities: the Ogale Community
and the Bille Kingdom in Ogoniland, Nigeria, which consists of
around 40,000 people.225 Over several years there have been
repeated oil spills from Shell’s pipelines in Ogoniland, many of
which have not been cleaned up.226
The plaintiffs seek
compensation through their suit for “damages arising as a result of
serious and ongoing pollution and environmental damage caused
Id. ¶ 53.
See Robert McCorquodale, Vedanta v. Lungowe Symposium: Duty of Care of
Parent
Companies,
OPINIO
JURIS
(Apr.
18,
2019),
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/18/symposium-duty-of-care-of-parent-companie
s/ [https://perma.cc/LXF2-6DQG].
224
Legal Claim by More than 2,500 Zambian Villagers in a Case Against Vedanta
Resources Limited, LEIGH DAY (Jan. 19, 2021) https://www.leighday.co.uk/latestupdates/news/2021-news/legal-claim-by-more-than-2-500-zambian-villagers-ina-case-against-vedanta-resources-limited/ [https://perma.cc/7C36-VHW6].
225
Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, ¶ 2-4 (Eng.).
226 Id. ¶ 2.
222
223
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by oil spills emanating from the Defendants’ oil pipelines and
associated infrastructure.”227 The losses suffered include damage to
land, and injury to livelihood and health.228 The case against the
U.K.-registered Royal Dutch Shell PLC (“RDS”) is based on the
common law of negligence and asserts that RDS breached its duty
of care to ensure that its subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development
Company of Nigeria (“SPDC”)’s operations in the Niger Delta did
not cause harm to the environment and their communities.229
Negligent management is alleged both in relation to maintenance of
the pipeline and facilities to acceptable standards, and to taking
effective measures to protect them from interference by third
parties.230 This interference took the form of unlawful siphoning of
oil by third parties incurring damage to the pipeline and other
facilities, and consequential oil spills.231 Shell challenged the
jurisdiction of the English courts to hear the case, and the matter
came for a preliminary hearing before the High Court.232 The judge
presiding ruled that the case could not proceed.233 As with Lungowe,
the plaintiffs needed an arguable case against the U.K.-registered
parent company, in order to be able to bring proceedings against
both it and its subsidiary, SPDC, in the English courts. This is
because RDS is the so-called “anchor defendant” (the defendant
domiciled in the jurisdiction).
The High Court’s decision that there was not an arguable case
was taken against the background to this litigation of RDS having
distanced itself from the operational side of oil production. This
occurred through a restructure in 2005, which made RDS “the
ultimate holding company of the Shell group of companies.”234 The
High Court judgment was upheld on appeal in a split decision of the
Court of Appeal.235 The majority held that the plaintiffs had not
established an arguable case that RDS had a duty of care to the
Nigerian communities affected by the pipeline.236 The available
evidence, which at that preliminary stage of the proceedings prior
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236

Id. (citing the particulars of the claim).
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 3. There are related claims made against the subsidiary, SPDC. Id.
Id. ¶ 98.
Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, ¶ 137 (Eng.).
Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, ¶ 6 (Eng.).
Id. ¶ 122.
Id. ¶ 83.
Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, ¶ 137 (Eng.).
Id. ¶ 132.
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to discovery was mostly limited to publicly available information
including group-wide policies,237 did not demonstrate the required
control over SPDC.238
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. Overruling the
Court of Appeal in a unanimous judgment, the Supreme Court
strongly affirmed its decision in Lungowe.239 According to the
Supreme Court judgment, the Court of Appeal majority’s focus on
the parent’s control over the subsidiary, SPDC, was inappropriate.
Citing Lungowe, the court held:
The issue is the extent to which the parent did take over or share
with the subsidiary the management of the relevant activity
(here the pipeline operation). That may or may not be
demonstrated by the parent controlling the subsidiary. In a
sense, all parents control their subsidiaries. That control gives
the parent the opportunity to get involved in management. But
control of a company and de facto management of part of its
activities are two different things. A subsidiary may maintain
de jure control of its activities, but nonetheless delegate de facto
management of part of them to emissaries of its parent.240
The Court noted that the internal documents that the plaintiffs
would need to demonstrate the role of RDS in managing the SPDC
pipeline operation at trial had not been discoverable at this point in
proceedings.241 Two documents that had been acquired by the
plaintiffs from a third party, the RDS Control Framework and the
RDS Health, Security, Safety and Environment Control Framework,
contained important information about operational organization
within the Shell group of companies. The Court was concerned that:
The production of [these two documents] for the appeal hearing
illustrate the danger of seeking summarily to determine issues
Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2021] UKSC 3, ¶ 136 (Eng.).
Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [20180 EWCA (Civ) 191, ¶ 122 (Eng.).
239
Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2021] UKSC 3 (Eng.); see also Ekaterina
Aristova & Carlos Lopez, UK Okpabi et al v Shell: UK Supreme Court Reaffirms Parent
Companies May Owe a Duty of Care Towards Communities Impacted by their Subsidiaries
in
Third
Countries,
OPINIO
JURIS
(Feb.
16,
2021),
http://opiniojuris.org/2021/02/16/uk-okpabi-et-al-v-shell-uk-supreme-court-rea
ffirms-parent-companies-may-owe-a-duty-of-care-towards-communities-impacte
d-by-their-subsidiaries-in-third-countries/ [https://perma.cc/8HGN-3HNU].
240
Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2021] UKSC 3, ¶ 147 (Eng.).
241 Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2021] UKSC 3, ¶ 136 (Eng.).
237
238
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which arise in parent/subsidiary cases such as this without
disclosure. Both are clearly material documents. Had there
been no appeal, the appellants’ claim would have been
dismissed without consideration of either of them.242
The Court’s emphasis on the need to consider the full body of
evidence on the parent’s involvement in the harmful activities,
rather than dismissing cases summarily, is welcomed.
iii.

AAA v. Unilever PLC

The facts of the AAA case are quite different to those of the other
two cases in the trilogy, and not typical for transnational business
and human rights claims. After the Kenyan presidential election in
2007, there was a wave of violence throughout the country.243 Riots
spread onto a tea plantation owned by one of Unilever’s
subsidiaries, Unilever Tea Kenya Ltd. (“UTKL”).244 The rioters
committed a number of atrocities there including rape and
murder.245 The plaintiffs are tea plantation workers who fell victim
to these violent acts, and family members of workers who were
killed during the incident.246 They sued Unilever and UTKL in
England, where Unilever is registered, alleging that the former, as
anchor defendant owed them a duty of care and breached that duty
by failing to put in place adequate crisis management policies.247 On
the question whether Unilever owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs,
the trial judge in the High Court found that the damage that
occurred on the tea plantation was not foreseeable by either
Unilever or UTKL.248 Foreseeability is one element of the test for a
duty of care in a novel situation.249 Another element, proximity, was
found to be present and Unilever’s corporate structure was
distinguishable from that of Shell.250
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250

Id. ¶ 136.
AAA v. Unilever PLC [2017] EWHC (QB) 371, [¶ 1, 12] (Eng.).
Id.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id.
Id. ¶ 95.
See Caparo Indus. PLC v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) 617-18 (Eng.).
AAA v. Unilever PLC [2017] EWHC (QB) 371, ¶ 103, 111 (Eng.).
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The Court of Appeal upheld the first instance decision on
foreseeability but overturned the decision on proximity, finding that
there was no proximity between the plaintiffs and Unilever.251 Lord
Justice Sales wrote the only judgment for the court. He identified
two categories of cases where a parent company would owe a duty
of care: “(i) where the parent [company] has in substance taken over
the management of the relevant activity of the subsidiary in place
of . . . the subsidiary’s own management; or (ii) where the parent
[company] has given relevant advice to the subsidiary about how it
should manage a particular risk.”252 The latter was potentially
applicable. He examined the policies that the company had in place
in respect of risk management and found that those provided by the
parent company were high-level, generic documents which left the
specifics to be established at the local level by the subsidiaries.253
Riots like those that occurred in 2007 had not happened on the tea
plantation before. Unilever did not hold superior knowledge on
local political or ethnic matters.254 For these reasons there was no
proximity between the parties and the appeal was rejected. The
plaintiffs sought permission to appeal the decision to the Supreme
Court, but permission was not granted, because the appeal did not
meet the test of raising an arguable point of law of general public
importance that ought to be considered by the Supreme Court.255
c. Discussion of the Trilogy
Determination of whether a parent company has sufficiently
intervened in the operations of its subsidiary to have incurred a
common law duty of care to the plaintiffs is a question both of law
and of fact. The Supreme Court in Lungowe approached the relevant
legal and factual analysis less restrictively for plaintiffs than the
Court of Appeal did in both Okpabi and Unilever, in which the
formalities of the corporate structure prevailed.
When it
AAA v. Unilever PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 1532 (Eng.).
Id. ¶ 37.
253 Id. ¶ 17, 40.
254 Id. ¶ 14.
255
See Chris Owen & Adam Bristow, Supreme Court Refuses Permission to
Appeal in Unilever Case, SIMMONS & SIMMONS (Jul. 19, 2019),
https://www.simmons-simmons.com/publications/ck0bagorz7ep70b94qy2xfp8
u/190719-mass-torts-case-alert-supreme-court-refuses-permission-to-appeal-in-un
ilever-case [https://perma.cc/5VTP-BHM6].
251
252
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acknowledged the various ways in which parent companies exert
management, supervision and control over subsidiaries and held
that “[e]verything depends on the extent to which, and the way in
which, the parent availed itself of the opportunity to take over,
intervene in, control, supervise or advise the management of the
relevant operations of the subsidiary,” the Supreme Court in
Lungowe was acknowledging that there are various levels of
intervention that might suffice for the parent company to incur a
duty of care to the plaintiffs.256 The parent advising the management
of the relevant operations of the subsidiary is relatively
commonplace, and undoubtedly easier for plaintiffs to prove, than
the parent taking over or controlling the management of these
operations. The Lungowe judgment also specifies that when it comes
to group-wide policies, failing to act in circumstances where the
parent company holds itself out as acting may be sufficient to incur
the relevant responsibility.257 Again, it may be easier for plaintiffs to
prove that the parent company should have done something but did
not, than to prove that the parent took over or controlled the
subsidiary.
This less restrictive approach is to be welcomed. The Supreme
Court took the opportunity in Okpabi to correct the Court of
Appeal’s error in that case of requiring that the parent company
control the subsidiary’s operations or have direct responsibility for
practices or failures which are the subject of the claim, and to solidify
its incremental expansion in direct parent company liability. This
was an important opportunity to clarify the law and its application
to the case in light of the ruling in Lungowe. There was no such
opportunity in the Unilever case but, as noted by one commentator:
It is plausible that, given the guidance of the Supreme Court in
Vedanta, a first instance judge [in the Unilever case] might now
approach the relevant legal and factual analysis around parent
company liability less restrictively and consider that the
relatively low jurisdictional bar was cleared.258
The Court of Appeal in the Unilever case was plainly wrong to
resolve the question of the parent company’s duty of care using the
Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20 ¶ 49 (Eng.).
Id. ¶ 53; see also McCorquodale, supra note 223.
258
Owen & Bristow, supra note 255; see also AAA v. Unilever PLC [2017]
EWHC (QB) 371 (Eng.).
256
257
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test of proximity that is applied in novel cases: this approach was
rejected in both Lungowe259 and Okpabi.260 If Okpabi does not settle
and goes to trial, the Supreme Court’s approach in Lungowe and
Okpabi will be applied to the facts ascertained through discovery,
providing greater elucidation of direct liability of parent
companies.261 This process of elucidation has also occurred through
the spread of the direct liability argument to other jurisdictions, the
subject addressed next.
V.

DIRECT LIABILITY SPREADS TO OTHER JURISDICTIONS

This Part identifies key trends in transnational business and
human rights litigation from jurisdictions outside the United States
and the United Kingdom. The expansion of tort litigation through
direct liability claims has been taken up in other common law
jurisdictions, notably Canada and, to a lesser extent, Australia. The
application of English common law precedent to claims brought in
civil law jurisdictions has transmitted the direct liability trend
outside common law jurisdictions. It is to these claims that this Part
turns first.
a. Civil Law Jurisdiction Cases in which English Common Law is the
Applicable Law
The application of English common law precedent to claims
brought in civil law jurisdictions has occurred in a handful of
transnational business and human rights cases. In the Dutch case of
Akpan v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC,262 the applicable law was Nigerian

Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, [¶ 54] (Eng.).
Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2021] UKSC 3 [¶ 151] (Eng.).
261
This has only happened before in Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA
(Civ) 525 (Eng.) and in Kalma v. African Minerals Ltd. [2018] EWHC 3506 (QB)
(Eng.), which was lost by the plaintiffs after the trial, the judge finding that there
was no evidence to support the allegation that the parent company was involved in
the negligent acts of primary perpetrator, the Sierra Leone police.
262
Rb’s Den Haag 30 januari 2013, JOR 2013, 162 m.nt. JF (Akpan/Royal Dutch
Shell PLC) (Neth.); Hof’s Den Haag 18 december 2015, NJF 2013, 3857 m.nt. F.C.S.
Warendorf (Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.); Hof’s Den Haag 29 januari
2021, NJ 2021, 77 m.nt. (Milieudefensie/Shell Petroleum NV) (Neth.).
259
260
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law, which draws on English precedent.263 The facts in Akpan were
similar to those in Okpabi: the allegations concern oil spills and
pollution in the Niger Delta and the defendant corporations are
Royal Dutch Shell PLC (the Anglo-Dutch parent company)264 and
Shell Petroleum and Development Company Ltd. (the Nigerian
subsidiary).265 A major difference is that Akpan is not a class action
like Okpabi, but rather three parallel claims brought by individual
fishermen and Friends of the Earth (Netherlands).266 The suit alleges
that the oil spills occurred due to a lack of maintenance of a wellhead
and inadequate safety measures to prevent sabotage.267
Notably Akpan was heard prior to the trilogy of English cases
discussed in Part IV above. At trial, the District Court of The Hague,
applying Nigerian law and, by extension, English law, had to apply
the principles from the case of Chandler v. Cape to the facts at hand.268
Its decision was to dismiss the claim against parent company,
RDS.269 The court decided that RDS was not engaged in the same
business as SPDC, one of the indicia from Chandler of parent
company direct liability, because it was not engaged in oil
production in Nigeria like SPDC.270 Therefore, RDS was not
expected to have better knowledge of how to prevent risks from
harm caused by oil spills and pollution than SPDC, meaning that
there was no proximity between the parties to ground a duty of
care.271 The court therefore found no reason to depart from the
principle in Nigerian and English tort law that there is no general
duty of care to prevent others from suffering harm as a result of the
activities of third parties.272 It did find for the plaintiffs against

Id.
Hof’s Den Haag 18 december 2015, NJF 2013, 3857 m.nt. F.C.S. Warendorf
(Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.). Although RDS is registered in the United
Kingdom, the Dutch courts can assert jurisdiction over it because the company is
actually headquartered in the Netherlands, and such jurisdiction in permissible
under arts. 4 and 63(1) of the Brussels Regulation, supra note 51.
265
Rb’s Den Haag 30 januari 2013, JOR 2013, 162 m.nt. JF (Akpan/Royal Dutch
Shell PLC) (Neth.).
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Id.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id.
263
264
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SPDC, however, making this one of the only transnational business
and human rights claims against a TNC to succeed at trial.273
The Dutch court’s restrictive approach to proximity was later
mirrored by the English courts in Okpabi. Akpan is not legal
precedent for the English courts, but it is certainly conceivable that
the courts in Okpabi were aware of the Dutch litigation, not least
because Shell is a defendant in both cases. The Akpan plaintiffs
appealed the District Court decision, and their appeal was
successful.274 By this time, the Lungowe judgment had been issued
by the U.K. Supreme Court, further elucidating the principles of
direct parent company liability. The court found a limited duty of
care in relation to the parent company’s response to the spill.275 The
judgment is in Dutch, but Lucas Roorda reports the following
outcome:
Based on internal documents, bonus policies and a witness
statement, the court concludes that after 2010 RDS was actively
trying to limit the amount of oil spills in SPDC’s operations,
amongst other things by installing Leak Detection Systems
(LDS) in its pipelines. The court thus finds that with respect to
the installation of an LDS in the Oruma pipeline, where it had
not been installed at the time of the proceedings, RDS had a duty
of care to the claimants. It orders Shell to insure it is installed
within a year.276
Thus, this case is the first time that plaintiffs have established,
following a full, merits trial, a common law duty of care on a parent
company towards them.277 A further case concerning oil pollution
in the Niger Delta is currently before the Italian courts.278 This is
against a different corporate defendant: the Italian oil company
ENI.279 Nigerian law and, by extension, English common law is the
Id.
Hof’s Den Haag 29 januari 2021, NJ 2021, 77 m.nt. (Milieudefensie/Shell
Petrpoleum NV) (Neth.).
275
Id.
276
Lucas Roorda, Wading Through the (Polluted) Mud: the Hague Court of Appeals
Rules on Shell in Nigeria, RIGHTS AS USUAL (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://rightsasusual.com/?p=1388 [https://perma.cc/89JQ-FKAV].
277
Id.
278
ESSEX BUS. & HUM. RTS. PROJECT, LEGAL OPINION ON ENGLISH COMMON LAW
PRINCIPLES OF TORT: ODODO FRANCIS TIMI V ENI AND NIGERIAN AGIP OIL COMPANY
(NAOC) 4-6 (2018).
279
Id.
273
274
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applicable law and the plaintiffs allege that the parent company is
directly liable in negligence.280 Thus the Akpan litigation is not an
isolated example.
Another case in which English common law precedent has been
applied in a civil law jurisdiction is Jabir v. KiK.281 A novel feature of
this case that differentiates it from most of the cases discussed so far
is that it concerns a first tier supplier, not a subsidiary.282 As noted
above, when corporations’ overseas operations are conducted
contractually through suppliers and licensees, the contractual veil
operates to prevent plaintiffs attributing direct liability to the lead
company.283 In Jabir, the plaintiffs attempted to persuade a German
court that the direct liability precedent from Chandler applies when
the relationship between the companies is one of contract rather
than of equity.284 The plaintiffs are victims of a fire in a textile factory
in Pakistan run by a Pakistani company called Ali Enterprises (A.E.),
and the families of those who died in the fire.285 KiK is a German
low-cost apparel retailer.286 A.E. produced almost exclusively for
KiK.287 The allegation in the case is that many of the factory
windows were barred, the emergency exits locked, and the building
had only one unobstructed exit, impeding the exit of employees
who, as a consequence, suffocated or were burned alive inside.288
The factory had recently been the subject of a health and safety audit
Id.
See Landgericht Dortmund [Dortmund District Court] Jan. 10, 2019, 7 O
95/15,
Justiz-online
(Ger.)
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/lgs/dortmund/lg_dortmund/j2019/7_O_95_1
5_Urteil_20190110.html [https://perma.cc/FQP5-JJKE].
282
See also Das v. George Weston Ltd., 2018 CanLII C64146; C64679 (Can.)
(another Canadian case concerning the collapse of the Rana Plaza building in
Bangladesh that was dismissed by the courts).
283
ANIL YILMAZ-VASTARDIS & SHELDON LEADER, UNIV. OF ESSEX, IMPROVING
PATHS TO BUSINESS ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE GLOBAL
SUPPLY
CHAINS:
A
LEGAL
GUIDE
(Dec.
2017)
http://repository.essex.ac.uk/21636/1/Improving-Paths-to-Accountability-forHuman-Rights-Abuses-in-the-Global-Supply-Chains-A-Legal-Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N8AC-G8SN].
284
Landgericht Dortmund [Dortmund District Court] Jan. 10, 2019, 7 O 95/15,
Justiz-online
(Ger.)
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/lgs/dortmund/lg_dortmund/j2019/7_O_95_1
5_Urteil_20190110.html [https://perma.cc/FQP5-JJKE].
285
Id.
286
Id.
287
Id.
288
Id.
280
281
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by an Italian social auditing firm, acting on behalf of KiK.289 These
safety problems were not identified.290 The plaintiffs sued the
company in Germany for compensation for personal injury and
death.291 Pakistani law, which is the applicable law in the case, is
derived from the common law, meaning that English law precedent
is used in novel cases.292
A brief on the applicable law that was submitted to the German
court argues that the case deals with the responsibilities of
purchasers of goods from suppliers in situations in which there is
not the arm’s length relationship characteristic of typical commercial
situations.293 It alleges that KiK was in a position similar to that of
the parent company in Chandler. KiK
had made a commitment to the health and safety policy to be
followed by [A.E.]; [Kik] had enough potential influence
over the supplier making it able to fully implement its
standards had it wished to; [KiK] had, via its auditor,
specialist knowledge of the criteria for distinguishing
adequate from inadequate factory safety provisions which
A.E. did not have; and [KiK] was in a line of business that
overlapped with that of A.E. sufficiently to make it fair that
its knowledge and experience should be brought to bear on
the improvements294
to safety that should have been made. The joint effect of this
superior knowledge of current safety criteria, taken together with its
failure to intervene to rectify working conditions, created an
environment in which A.E. relied on KiK’s guidance and was
encouraged to continue its workplace practices due to the absence
of pressure from KiK.
The case did not reach trial however, meaning that these
arguments on parent company liability were not fully considered in
court. Having been granted legal aid by the court on the basis of an
arguable case,295 the court later dismissed the case because the
Id.
Id.
291
Id.
292
Id.
293
See Legal Opinion on Jabir, supra note 176.
294
Id. ¶ 14.
295
KiK muss wegen Fabrikbrand vor Gericht, ZEIT ONLINE (Aug. 30, 2016),
http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/2016-08/schadenersatzklage-kikpakistan-brandprozesskostenhilfe-textilfabrik (last visited May 22, 2021).
289
290
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statute of limitation had expired.296 The outcome of the litigation
was therefore reached on process rather than substance, and the
plaintiffs have appealed.297
b. Canadian Cases
As a major global center for mining, Canada has been a key
jurisdiction for claims against parent companies in this sector in
which direct liability is alleged. Choc v. Hudbay Minerals, Inc.298 is
one such case. The allegation that lies behind this litigation is that
the security personnel at Hudbay Minerals’ former mining project
in Guatemala along with Guatemalan police and military engaged
in numerous human rights abuses, including shooting, killing and
rape, when evicting local people from a mine site.299 The security
personnel were hired by Hudbay’s 98.2% owned subsidiary.300 The
plaintiffs’ primary argument is an allegation that Hudbay owed a
direct duty of care to them to prevent the harms in question.301 In
the alternative, they seek to hold Hudbay liable by piercing the
corporate veil.302
The case has survived a preliminary challenge on the basis of
forum non conveniens and a motion to dismiss on the merits of the
claim.303 With regard to the allegation of direct negligence against
the parent company, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had
296
Landgericht Dortmund [Dortmund District Court] Jan. 10, 2019, 7 O 95/15,
Justiz-online
(Ger.)
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/lgs/dortmund/lg_dortmund/j2019/7_O_95_1
5_Urteil_20190110.html [https://perma.cc/FQP5-JJKE].
297
KiK Lawsuit (re Pakistan), Bus. & Hum. Rts. Res. Centre,
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/kik-lawsuit-re-pakistan
/ [https://perma.cc/58ZD-FG9X].
298
Choc v. Hudbay Minerals, Inc., [2013] 116 O.R. 3d 764 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.); see also Garcia v. Tahoe Resources Inc., 2017 BCCA 39 (Can.) (a similar case that
was recently settled); Skinner, supra note 42, at 1836; Pan American Silver, Pan
American Silver Announces Resolution of Garcia v. Tahoe Case, BUS. & HUM. RTS.
RESOURCE CTR. (Jul. 30, 2019), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/panamerican-silver-announces-resolution-of-garcia-v-tahoe-case
[https://perma.cc/8QHS-EFE2].
299
Choc v. Hudbay Minerals, Inc., [2013] 116 O.R. 3d 764, ¶ 4 (Can. Ont. Sup.
Ct. J.).
300
Id. ¶ 10.
301 Id. ¶ 24.
302
Id.
303
Id. ¶ 87.
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sufficiently pleaded both foreseeability and proximity between the
plaintiffs and defendants to found a novel claim such as this.304 The
test for foreseeability is whether the harm was “a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s act.”305 The plaintiffs
argue inter alia that the company knew that the security forces
frequently used violence to evict people and that this had happened
at the proposed mine site on a previous occasion.306 These
allegations of a high level of parent company knowledge were
sufficient for the court to find foreseeability arguable.307 The test for
proximity is “the circumstances of the relationship inhering between
the plaintiff and the defendant are of such a nature that the
defendant may be said to be under an obligation to be mindful of
the plaintiff’s legitimate interests in conducting his or her affairs.”308
The court found that the allegations sufficiently alleged proximity.309
These allegations included statements made by Hudbay asserting its
direct involvement and its high level of operational oversight of the
subsidiary and the security personnel, and that it did everything in
its power to ensure the evictions were carried out in accordance with
human rights.310 The court granted Amnesty International Canada
intervener status in the litigation.311 Amnesty International cited the
English case law discussed above to support its argument that
parent company liability is not new to tort law, and that the
imposition of a duty of care was therefore foreseeable to the
corporate defendants.312 This argument, and the relevance of the
English law precedent, will be considered at trial.313
304

J.).

Choc v. Hudbay Minerals, Inc., [2013] 116 O.R. 3d 764 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.

Id. ¶ 60.
Id.
307 Id. ¶ 65.
308 Id. ¶ 66.
309 Id. ¶ 70.
310 Id. ¶¶ 69-70.
311 Id. ¶ 3.
312
Factum of the Intervenor, Amnesty International Canada ¶ 25, Choc v.
Hudbay Minerals, Inc., [2013] 116 O.R. 3d 764 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
313
The case has remained in discovery for a number of years. On January 21,
2020, the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario ruled in favor of the plaintiff’s in
response to Hudbay’s motion to block them from amending their complaint to
include further details of rapes committed by the mining security forces. See
Hudbay Minerals Lawsuits (re Guatemala), BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR.,
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/hudbay-minerals-laws
uits-re-guatemala-3/ [https://perma.cc/L5EC-PU5P].
305
306
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In Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya, the plaintiffs, three Eritrean
refugees, claim, on behalf of themselves and more than 1,000
Eritrean workers, that Nevsun is liable in negligence and for
breaches of customary international law including forced labor,
torture, slavery, and crimes against humanity.314 The claims relate
to Nevsun’s alleged complicity in the use of forced labor at a mine
site in Eritrea.315 The mine is jointly owned by Nevsun (60%) and
the Eritrean state (40%).316 The Eritrean state drafted labor for the
mine site using its National Service Program—a system known to
amount to use of forced labor.317 An attempt by Nevsun to have the
claims under customary international law struck out was
unsuccessful, the court finding it at least arguable that customary
international law forms part of Canada’s common law and rejecting
the defendant’s defenses based on act of state and forum non
conveniens.318 The decision as it related to customary international
law and act of state was the subject of an appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada. In a long-awaited judgment released in February
2020, the court held by a majority of five to four that the claims based
on customary international law could proceed.319 The majority
concluded that under the “doctrine of adoption,” peremptory norms
of customary international law are automatically adopted into
Canadian domestic law,320 and the plaintiffs’ pleadings based on
customary international law did not therefore “disclose no
reasonable claim.”321 The significance of this ruling is that it opens
up the possibility of enforcing customary international human
rights law through the common law, making this case more like the
old U.S. ATS cases than the new U.K. tort cases. These cases, along
with their counterparts in other common law countries,322 and the
314
Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5 (Can.) (settled out of court in
October 2020); see Peter Muchlinski, Corporate Liability for Breaches of Fundamental
Human Rights in Canadian Law: Nevsun Resources Limited v Araya, 1 AMICUS
CURIAE 505 (2020); Palombo, supra note 5.
315
Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5 (Can.).
316 Id. ¶ 7.
317 Id. ¶ 310.
318 Id. ¶¶ 177-97.
319 Id. ¶ 132.
320 Id. ¶ 86.
321 Id. ¶ 148.
322
There has also been at least one case in negligence brought against private
corporate contractors operating Australia’s offshore refugee detention centers
claiming they owed duties of care, together with the government, in respect of the
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cases in civil law jurisdictions described above, indicate that the U.K.
precedent is being amplified in international jurisprudence.
VI.

DIRECT LIABILITY AS A PATH FORWARDS FOR PLAINTIFFS
IN THE UNITED STATES

As can be seen from the preceding discussion, there are reasons
to be cautiously optimistic for plaintiffs about the gradual expansion
of direct liability in transnational business and human rights
litigation in English case law. The jurisdictional veil in cases against
parent companies, still a significant hurdle for plaintiffs in U.S.
courts, was diminished as an impediment for plaintiffs in the
English cases as a result of developments at the European level.323
This has placed the focus firmly on the corporate veil, and more
specifically on attributing liability to the parent company. Lungowe
and Okpabi are clearly an important legal milestone for plaintiffs in
tackling this hurdle. To have two decisions from the U.K. Supreme
Court on the subject within a two-year period is highly significant
to the shaping of direct parent company liability. With the use of
English law precedent in some common law jurisdictions, and in the
civil law jurisdiction cases described above, the significance of this
case extends beyond England. While wholesale reform of the
corporate veil in transnational business and human rights litigation
remains elusive, the incremental expansion of direct parent
company liability offers a pragmatic way forward for plaintiffs.
In contrast, the situation for plaintiffs in the United States is far
more sanguine. The outcome of Kiobel came as a blow to the
corporate accountability movement. Up until that point most, if not
all, ATS cases against corporate defendants concerned harmful
events that occurred overseas. The decision in Kiobel that the
principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality
apply to the ATS therefore represented a sea-change in the
interpretation of the statute and, going forward, the touch and
concern test presents an enormous hurdle to plaintiffs. The closing
health and wellbeing of the refugees in their control. See Kamasaee v Commonwealth
[2015] VSC 148 (Austl.).
323
Brussels Regulation, supra note 51; Owusu v. Jackson [2005] ECR 1445
(Eng.). Note that forum non conveniens type arguments are used by defendants to
defend claims made against foreign corporations. See Vedanta Resources PLC v.
Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, ¶ 13 (Eng.). The departure of the United Kingdom from
the European Union has implications here. See Aristova, supra note 200.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/1

2021]

Parent Company Direct Liability

575

off of litigation against foreign corporations means that all aspects
of culpable behavior—those of the parent and those of the
subsidiary—cannot be examined in the same ATS case. Of greater
significance, corporate liability under international law, and
consequently under the statute, is precarious, with a decision from
the Supreme Court on this subject coming in 2021.324
When it comes to attributing liability to the parent company in
transnational business and human rights litigation, the test for
agency—the primary argument used by plaintiffs seeking to
attribute liability to parent companies in the United States—is more
exacting for plaintiffs to prove than the direct liability test from the
English line of cases. While both tests involve an examination of the
relationship between the parent company and the subsidiary,
focusing in particular on their interaction over the activities that are
the subject of the claim, agency requires that the parent company
dominate the relevant activities, while direct liability considers more
broadly the extent to which the parent company takes over,
intervenes in, controls, supervises, or advises the management of the
relevant operations. Put simply, the former entails more parent
company involvement than the latter. The Lungowe judgment also
provides that a duty of care may be imposed when, through groupwide policies, the parent company holds itself out as supervising the
subsidiary, but it omits to do so in practice.325 This is highly relevant
in the context of global business, where expectations for the
corporate group are communicated through group-wide policies on
subjects such as security, health and safety, the environment, and
human rights. For example, in Acuña-Atalaya the parent company
sets standards and provides policies for its subsidiary, including on
human rights and security, and is alleged to have failed to ensure
that these were followed.326 By attributing liability where a
company holds itself out as supervising, but omits to do so in
practice, direct liability could be the key to success for the plaintiffs
in this case.
Agency is a means by which the wrongs of the subsidiary can be
visited upon the parent. Direct liability, on the other hand, looks
squarely at the parent company and attributes liability for its role in
the wrongdoing of the subsidiary. There is an important difference
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I, 141 S. Ct. 188 (2020) (cert. granted).
Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, ¶ 20 (Eng.); see also
McCorquodale, supra note 223.
326
Acuña-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp., 308 F. Supp. 3d 812 (D. Del.
2018), vacated and remanded, 765 F. App’x 811 (3d Cir. 2019).
324
325
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here, in terms of framing the wrongdoing and locating the problem.
It is not the subsidiary doing wrong overseas and the parent
company being found liable for it, but the parent company’s acts and
omissions, some of which occur at headquarter level, that are under
scrutiny.
What lessons can be taken from the positive U.K. experience? At
least one leading scholar contends that the U.S. courts may at some
point accept the direct liability argument in transnational tort
litigation, implicitly clarifying that there is no reason in principle for
courts not to do so.327 Acceptance of the direct liability argument by
the U.S. courts offers a path forward for transnational business and
human rights litigation. Not only is direct liability easier for
plaintiffs to establish, diminishing one of the many hurdles that
plaintiffs in such cases face, but using this argument also allows the
courts to look more broadly at the interaction between a parent and
subsidiary company and attribute liability for involvement that falls
short of domination but is nonetheless culpable behavior on the
parent’s part that plays a significant role in the subsidiary’s
wrongdoing. By examining the interaction between parent and
subsidiary, and the parent and the victim, and focusing on the
culpable actions/omissions that occurred at headquarter level,
direct liability connects transnational business and human rights
cases with the U.S. jurisdiction. This provides a powerful argument
to counter forum non conveniens, meaning that in cases like AcuñaAtalaya, the courts are in better position to find a meaningful nexus
between the United States and the decisions and practices that form
the subject of the claim, and will be less likely therefore to dismiss
on forum non conveniens grounds. It also strengthens the argument
that federal or state law is the applicable law in a given case,328 and
is in keeping with the focus on domestic culpable conduct that the
touch and concern test from Kiobel requires of ATS litigation.
At a higher level, the English case law may go some way to
assuage the U.S. courts’ fear, underpinning the decisions in Kiobel,
Bauman, and Jesner, about jurisdictional overreach of the U.S. courts
and, consequently, impact on foreign relations. This applies to
federal courts in ATS claims and federal or state courts in
conventional tort claims. It is clear from the direct liability line of
cases that parent company home state courts outside the United
Curran, supra note 57, at 443.
See Alford, supra note 13 (discussing conflict of laws in transnational
business and human rights litigation).
327
328
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States are accepting jurisdiction over transnational business and
human rights claims. While not serving as precedent for the U.S.
courts, these cases can nonetheless be used by plaintiff lawyers to
evidence a global trend of provision of access to remedy in
transboundary human rights cases in which the parent company is
sufficiently involved in the operations of the subsidiary. This trend
can be linked to the commentary to the UNGPs,329 which tells states
that they should provide access to remedy in extraterritorial cases
when host state courts do not,330 and likewise to the General
Comment of the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
on this subject, which holds that the extraterritorial obligation to
protect requires state parties to take steps to prevent and redress
infringements of Covenant rights that occur outside their territories
due to the activities of business entities over which they can exercise
control, especially in cases where the remedies available to victims
before the domestic courts of the state where the harm occurs are
unavailable or ineffective.331
329
Note that the U.K. Supreme Court declined to reference international
standards in Lungowe. But see McCorquodale, supra note 223. Such standards have
been referenced in certain cases though. See Choc v. Hudbay Minerals, Inc., [2013]
116 O.R. 3d 764 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (noting that Amnesty, an intervener in the
case, argued that the UNGPs and other norms support the view that a duty of care
may exist in circumstances where a parent company’s subsidiary is alleged to be
involved in gross human rights abuses). Amnesty also argued that, because the
Canadian government endorsed the UNGPs, Canadian courts should have no
difficulty in drawing upon them in considering whether a Canadian corporation
owes a duty of care. Id. ¶ 26.
330
UNGPs, supra note 58, Principle 26 and Commentary.
331
See Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General
Comment No 24, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/24 (2017); see also Econ. & Soc. Council,
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 14, ¶ 39, Docs.
E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) (stating that in order to comply with their international
obligations, state parties to ICESCR have to respect the enjoyment of the rights
stipulated in the Covenant in other countries, inter alia, by preventing third parties
from violating the right in other countries “if they are able to influence these third
parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations and applicable international law”); Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm.
on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 15, ¶ 33, U.N. Docs.
E/C.12/2002/11 (2003) (making explicit reference to preventing companies from
violating the right to water of individuals and communities in other countries);
Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No.
19, ¶ 54, U.N. Docs. E/C.12/GC/19 (2009).
Similar statements have been made through the use of concluding observations.
See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination:
Canada, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/18 (2007); Comm. on the Elimination
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CONCLUSION

This Article has considered one impediment to access to remedy
for victims of human rights violations at the hands of corporate
actors, namely the corporate veil, and in light of this impediment,
how to attribute liability to parent companies in transnational
business and human rights litigation. Further impediments were
acknowledged, prominent among them the jurisdictional veil.
Future scholarship should consider extraterritoriality in the context
of transnational business and human rights litigation, examining the
operation of the presumption against extraterritoriality/prohibition
on ATS claims against foreign corporations, and the different
approach to this issue under foreign laws such as European law. 332
The decision of the U.K. Supreme Court in Lungowe on the forum non
conveniens question, discussed in other works,333 may be instructive.
Future scholarship should also address the broader question of
whether the United Kingdom—or now perhaps Canada—is
becoming the new forum for victims to bring human rights litigation
against corporate defendants. The United States provided such
victims with some prospect of access to remedy through the cause
of action under the ATS and through a wide test for personal
jurisdiction over corporate defendants. The United Kingdom on the
other hand traditionally remained adherent to the strictures of the
corporate veil.334 This Article has plotted the trend whereby the
United States has restricted access to remedy for such victims,
meanwhile the United Kingdom has opened up a route for plaintiffs
of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United States, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (2008); Human Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations on
the Sixth Periodic Report of Germany, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/DEU/CO/6
(2012); see also Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts.,
Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Austria, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc.
E/C 12/AUT/CO/4 (2013); Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rts., Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Norway, ¶ 6, U.N.
Doc. E/C 12/NOR/CO/5 (2013).
332
For a discussion of the proper jurisdictional limits of the ATS, see Doug
Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Supreme Court Leaves
the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773 (2014).
333
See Gabrielle Holly, Vedanta v. Lungowe Symposium: A Non Conveniens
Revival–The Supreme Court’s Approach to Jurisdiction in Vedanta, OPINIO JURIS (Apr.
24, 2019), https://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/24/vedanta-v-lungowe-symposium-anon-conveniens-revival-the-supreme-courts-approach-to-jurisdiction-in-vedanta%
EF%BB%BF/ [https://perma.cc/WZ7T-Z2Y2].
334
Adams v. Cape Industries PLC [1989] AC 433 (Eng.).
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to attribute liability to parent companies through direct liability.
The reticence on the part of the U.S. courts to provide access to
remedy to foreign plaintiffs where human rights violations are
alleged against corporate actors stands in contrast to the country’s
willingness to extend its jurisdiction extraterritorially in other fields,
for instance through expansive claims to jurisdiction in the field of
competition law.335 The United Kingdom’s openness to such claims
may in part be explained by its membership of the European Union,
which has explicitly encouraged extraterritorial jurisdiction where
host state remedies for business and human rights cases are elusive
and untenable,336 prompting the question whether this trend will be
reversed after Brexit.337 These important concerns will no doubt be
taken up elsewhere but suffice here to say that, in line with the
viewpoint expressed in article, it is hoped that regardless of political
developments, the English courts will continue to develop and
expand direct parent company liability, and that the U.S. courts will
adopt a similar course.

335
See, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Ctr.
Inc., No. 96-170, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5816, at *137-38 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1962); see
also MUCHLINSKI, supra note 55, at 134-35.
336
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS., IMPROVING ACCESS TO
REMEDY IN THE AREA OF BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE EU LEVEL (2017); Access
to Legal Remedies for Victims of Corporate Human Rights Abuses in Third
Countries, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 603.475 (2019).
337
Brussels Regulation, supra note 51, no longer applies in the United
Kingdom post Brexit. See Aristova, supra note 200. The decision on jurisdiction in
Lungowe, not discussed in this article, demonstrated an expansive solution to this
issue; the Supreme Court found that the case could proceed in England because the
plaintiffs lacked access to substantial justice in Zambia. It is hoped that this
approach will continue under any new law on jurisdiction.
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